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On behalf of the Banco de España, it is my pleasure to announce the second issue of the Research Update for 
2015. This issue comes at the outset of a period of important changes in the Directorate General of Economics, 
Statistics and Research (known in Spanish as the “Servicio de Estudios”). After more than two decades leading 
the Directorate General, José Luis Malo de Molina resigned last September and was appointed adviser on 
European Monetary and Financial Affairs at the Permanent Representation of Spain to the European Union, in 
Brussels. In parallel I was appointed by the Executive Commission of the Banco de España as the new Director 
General. 
The Banco de España strongly believes in the importance of grounding its policy work in high-quality empirical 
and theoretical research, and I hope to maintain our institution’s reputation for state-of-the-art economic thinking 
that Mr. Malo de Molina nurtured over the years. I will be supported in this endeavor by Óscar Arce, who is taking 
over as Director of the Department of Monetary and Financial Studies, and by a diverse and highly qualified 
research staff, including a number of recently hired economists who are profiled in this Update.
As in previous issues, this Research Update includes a number of feature articles on topics of current 
macroeconomic policy relevance. 
An article by Miguel García-Posada and Marcos Marchetti studies the impact of recent nonconventional monetary 
policy actions of the Eurosystem, presenting evidence from Spanish data that the “Very Long-Term Refinancing 
Operations” of 2011-2012 stimulated bank lending to small and medium firms. A second article, by Galo Nuño 
and Carlos Thomas, argues that while monetary policy could be used to increase the sustainability of sovereign 
debt, it is better to eliminate this option entirely, because the gain from decreasing default risk is more than offset 
by the cost of greater inflation risk. Finally, an article by Juan Jimeno, and another by Yunus Aksoy, Henrique 
Basso, Tobias Grasl, and Ron Smith, both explore the longer-run challenges faced by countries with high debt 
and declining population.
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bids fully satisfied at a fixed interest rate, as long as 
they had enough eligible collateral to pledge) with a 
maturity of three years. The interest rates of these 
operations were set much lower than those borne by 
banks in wholesale markets at the time. The 
participation in these operations by banks was very 
large, implying a massive liquidity injection into the 
financial sector.
As credit to the non-financial private sector continued 
to decline after the VLTROs –as shown for the case of 
Spanish firms in Figure 1- serious doubts about their 
effectiveness were raised. Nevertheless, the extremely 
weak macroeconomic conditions prevailing in that 
period –which reduced credit demand and increased 
credit risk- and the liquidity and funding risks 
experienced by banks –which constrained credit 
supply- make it reasonable to ask whether credit 
would have declined even more in the absence of the 
VLTROs. This study aims to answer this question for 
the case of Spain.
FEaturEs
thE BaNK LENdING chaNNEL OF uNcONVENtIONaL 
MONEtarY pOLIcY: thE IMpact OF thE VLtrOs ON crEdIt 
suppLY IN spaIN
MIGUEL GARCíA-POSADA AND MARCOS MARCHETTI
WORkING PAPER Nº 1512
We assess the impact of the two very long term 
refinancing operations (VLTROs) conducted by the 
Eurosystem in December 2011 and February 2012 on 
credit supply to Spanish non-financial corporations, 
using data from a sample of more than one million bank-
firm lending relationships during two years. Our 
methodology tackles the two main identification 
challenges: (i) how to disentangle credit supply from 
demand; (ii) the endogeneity of the VLTRO bids, as 
banks with more severe funding difficulties were more 
likely to ask for a large amount of funds and to restrain 
credit supply. First, we exploit the fact that many firms 
borrow from several banks simultaneously to control for 
firm-specific credit demand. Second, we control for 
banks’ funding difficulties by constructing several 
measures of balance-sheet strength and by including 
bank fixed effects. Our findings suggest that the VLTROs 
had a positive, moderate-sized effect on banks’ credit 
supply to firms, providing evidence of a bank lending 
channel in the context of unconventional monetary 
policy. The effect was greater for banks with less liquid 
assets, and for small and medium enterprises; there was 
no impact on loans to large firms.
1  Introduction
The intensification of the European sovereign debt 
crisis in the second half of 2011 hampered euro area 
banks’ access to market-based funding, especially in 
Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain. The funding 
and deleveraging pressures borne by credit institutions 
risked curtailing lending to euro area households and 
non-financial firms. Against this background, the ECB 
decided to implement additional non-standard policy 
measures on 8 December 2011. These included two 
very long term refinancing operations (VLTROs), which 
were carried out at the end of December 2011 and in 
February 2012, respectively. The VLTROs were fixed-
rate full allotment procedures (i.e., all banks had their 
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NOTE: The grey area corresponds to the period between December 
2011-February 2012 when the two VLTROs took place. 
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2  Identification strategy
We can express our identification strategy with the 
following equations: 
(1)
(2)
where i refers to bank, j to firm and t to year and month. 
Here, ∆Credit ijt is the monthly credit growth rate (in 
annualised terms): VLTRO it is the product of the gross 
amount of funds borrowed at the two VLTROs scaled 
by bank’s total assets (VLTRO i ) and an indicator 
variable I (t ≥ 2011M12) that equals 1 since December 
2011 (when the first VLTRO took place): The a jt are 
time-varying firm fixed effects, b i are bank fixed effects, 
BANk_VAR are time-varying bank characteristics and 
e ijt is a regression disturbance. 
To assess the causal impact of the VLTROs on credit 
supply, two main identification challenges must be 
addressed. First, changes in credit supply must be 
disentangled from changes in credit demand. For 
instance, a credit contraction during a financial crisis 
can be due both to a reduction in credit supply (banks 
reduce credit supply to increase their capital and 
liquidity buffers) and to a drop in credit demand (firms 
reduce their demand for credit as they find less 
profitable investment opportunities). Second, banks’ 
recourse to VLTROs and supply problems may be 
correlated. As banks that have a harder time obtaining 
funding are more likely both to borrow more funds in 
the VLTROs and to cut loan supply, VLTRO it may be 
endogenous, blasing the estimated coefficient b. 
We address the first problem by exploiting the fact that 
many firms simultaneously borrow from several banks, 
a strategy first implemented by Gan (2007) and khwaja 
and Mian (2008). This allows us to include in the 
regression time-varying firm fixed effects a jt (i.e., a 
dummy for every firm-time combination, at monthly 
frequency) that control for all (observed and unobserved) 
firm heterogeneity, including credit demand. 
To address the second problem we control for banks’ 
funding conditions by including a large set of time-
varying bank characteristics such as liquidity, capital, 
loan quality, profitability, and size, as well as bank fixed 
effects. Even if this approach did not fully remove this 
bias, we would know its sign: we would expect a 
downward bias in the coefficient on VLTRO it , as banks 
with more (less) deteriorated funding conditions are 
expected to borrow more (less) funds in the VLTROs 
and to exhibit a lower (higher) credit growth. Hence our 
identification strategy estimates a lower bound on the 
true causal impact. 
3  data sources and sample
We collect data referring to the 11 months before and 
after the first VLTRO, i.e., from January 2011 to 
November 2012. Data on credit are drawn from the 
Banco de España’s Credit Register (CIR), which 
contains monthly information on all bank-firm 
relationships over a reporting threshold of 6,000€ for 
credit institutions operating in Spain. We focus on loans 
granted to Spanish non-financial corporations. To 
include time-varying firm fixed effects in our regressions 
we only keep firms borrowing from at least two banks 
at the same time: those companies accounted for 38% 
of the total number of firms and 75% of the credit to 
non-financial companies registered in the CIR in 
December 2011. Unconsolidated bank balance sheet 
data are obtained from the supervisory reports that 
banks must file each month. The gross amount of funds 
borrowed at the two VLTROs by each Spanish bank 
comes from the Banco de España’s Operations 
Department. We add the funds received by each bank 
in the VLTROs of December 2011 and February 2012 
because both operations were announced at the same 
time, making the second VLTRO a fully anticipated 
shock. Our final sample has more than 12 million 
observations, with 42 banks, 315,000 firms, more than 
one million firm-bank relationships and 23 months.
4  Main results
Our main results are derived from the regressions of 
Table 1. In column (1), the coefficient on VLTRO it is 
positive and statistically significant, implying that the 
marginal impact of the VLTRO uptake by an individual 
bank on its credit growth is around 0.076. To estimate 
the aggregate impact of the two VLTROs on credit 
growth we make a weighted average of the individual 
impacts (i.e., the products of the marginal impact and 
each bank’s VLTRO uptake), where the weights are the 
ratio of each bank’s outstanding loans to all loans in the 
sample. Algebraically: 
(3)
Where
 
(4)
and (5)
∆Credit ijt = βVLTRO it + a jt + b i + ∑ k=1 b 
k BANK_VAR it-1 + e ijt ,
K k
VLTRO it= VLTRO i∙ I (t ≥ 2011M12), 
Agg_Impact = ∑ i = 1  
∂I ∆ Credit ijt
∂ VLTRO it
∙ VLTRO i ∙ ωi
∂∆ Credit ijt
∂ VLTRO it
= β
ω i =   I
Credit i
Credit i∑ i = 1
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Assuming that b = 0.076 for all banks, the aggregate 
impact of the two VLTROs on annual credit growth was 
0.8%. Of course, this does not mean that the VLTROs 
actually increased the available credit, but that they 
reduced the rate of contraction of lending: if they had 
not been implemented, credit to non-financial 
corporations would have decreased at a rate 0.8% 
higher than it did. As the average annual growth rate of 
the credit to non-financial corporations in the twelve 
months after the implementation of the first VLTRO was 
-5.1%, the VLTROs had a moderate-sized effect.
Another relevant question is whether the impact of 
VLTROs on credit to non-financial corporations depended 
                                        
All Firms (1) Large (2) )3(sEMS )4(smrif llA
VLTRO*I (t>2011M11) 0.076** 0.001 0.077** 0.083***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.031) (0.030)
VLTRO*I (t>2011M11) X Liquidity Ratio (t-1) -0.002**
(0.001)
Liquidity Ratio (t-1) 0.027 0.094** 0.026 0.040*
(0.021) (0.035) (0.021) (0.021)
Log [Loan to Deposits (t-1)] 3.228* 7.896*** 3.024* 3.218*
(1.709) (2.657) (1.747) (1.798)
Capital Ratio (t-1) -0.076 -0.257 -0.072 -0.079
(0.088) (0.310) (0.084) (0.092)
NPL Ratio (t-1) -0.001 -0.076 0.004 -0.022
(0.041) (0.094) (0.041) (0.042)
Resident Deposits (t-1) 0.073    0.209** 0.070 0.075*
(0.044) (0.103) (0.044) (0.043)
No Resident Deposits (t-1) -0.057** -0.049 -0.056** -0.052*
(0.026) (0.050) (0.027) (0.026)
ROA (t-1) 0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Log [Total Assets (t-1)] 0.940 -2.414 1.065 1.118
(1.201) (3.322) (1.123) (1.240)
Relationship Length (t-1) 0.324*** 0.768*** 0.309*** 0.325***
(0.039) (0.123) (0.039) (0.040)
Log [HHI (t-1)] -1.379** -3.232 -1.299** -1.597***
(0.567) (2.275) (0.595) (0.544)
Firm-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 12,181,556 232,175 11,818,378 12,181,556
R-squared 0.48 0.35 0.49 0.48
Dependent variable: credit growth
IMPACT OF VLTROs ON CREDIT GROWTH TABLE 1
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
NOTE: Estimator: OLS. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the bank’s credit 
portfolio by industry.  NPL ratio is the non-performing loan ratio. Columns (2) and (3) show the estimations of separate regressions run on sub-samples of large 
companies and SMEs, respectively. 
on the size of those firms, as small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) are believed to be more vulnerable to 
a decline in credit than larger companies, as they often 
lack access to alternative sources of external finance. To 
answer this question, we split the sample into SMEs and 
large firms using the indicator variable constructed by 
Martínez Carrascal and Mulino (2014), and then rerun the 
specification from column (1). Columns (2) and (3) show 
that the VLTROs had no impact on the supply of credit to 
large firms, but had a sizeable effect on loans to SMEs. 
We also wish to know whether the transmission of the 
VLTROs depended on some banks’ characteristics. 
Column (4) shows the estimates when we add an 
interaction between VLTRO_it and a liquidity ratio. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 6 ReseaRch update, fall 2015
The negative coefficient on that interaction means that 
the VLTROs had a larger positive impact on banks with 
less liquid assets, consistent with previous evidence on 
the transmission of monetary policy (e.g. Jiménez et al., 
2012). Finally, it is also worth mentioning the positive 
coefficient on relationship length across all 
specifications: a longer relationship between the firm 
and the bank led to a higher credit supply, consistent 
with previous findings on relationship lending (e.g., 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994).
5  conclusions
This paper evaluates the impact on credit supply of the 
two very long term refinancing operations (VLTROs) 
implemented by the Eurosystem in response to the 
intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis in 
the second half of 2011. The estimates indicate that the 
VLTROs helped forestall a further contraction of credit in 
Spain. The Spanish experience is particularly informative 
because Spain was severely hit by the crisis, and is one 
of the largest economies in the euro area, and has a 
bank-based financial system. 
Our findings suggest that the VLTROs had a positive, 
moderate-sized effect on the supply of bank credit to 
firms in the twelve months after the first VLTRO (December 
2011 to November 2012), providing evidence of a “bank 
lending channel” in the context of unconventional 
monetary policy. We also find that the VLTROs had a 
sizeable impact on credit to SMEs, while they had no 
effect on the loans to large firms. Finally, it seems that the 
VLTROs had a greater impact on the credit supply of 
banks with less liquid assets, which suggests that part of 
its effect worked through the mitigation of liquidity risks. 
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brake’ that reassures investors in sovereign debt.1 On 
the other hand, such a course of action may presumably 
give rise to inflation, with the resulting costs and 
distortions. Moreover, while using inflation temporarily 
for debt elimination purposes may not greatly affect 
inflation expectations in countries (such as the US or 
Uk) where monetary authorities are perceived to have 
a clear and credible commitment towards price 
stability, the same may not be true in countries with a 
poorer inflation record and/or weaker monetary 
credibility, thus limiting the effectiveness of this 
strategy
In this paper, we try to shed light on the above issues 
by studying the trade-offs between price stability and 
sovereign debt sustainability when the government 
cannot make credible commitments about inflation.2
Methodology
To analyze the above question, we build a model of a 
small open economy in which a government issues 
long-term sovereign nominal bonds to foreign 
investors.3 At any time, the government may default on 
its debt if it finds it optimal to do so. Default produces 
some costs due to temporary exclusion from capital 
markets and a drop in output. In addition, the 
government chooses fiscal and monetary policy 
optimally under discretion. That is, the government 
cannot commit to a future path for primary deficit and 
inflation. When choosing inflation, the government 
trades off benefits and costs. On the one hand, inflation 
MONEtarY pOLIcY aNd sOVErEIGN dEBt VuLNEraBILItY
GALO NUñO AND CARLOS THOMAS
WORkING PAPER Nº 1517
We investigate the trade-offs between price stability and 
the sustainability of sovereign debt, using a small open 
economy model where the government issues nominal 
defaultable debt and chooses fiscal and monetary policy 
under discretion. Inflation reduces the real value of 
outstanding debt, thus making it more sustainable; but it 
also raises nominal yields and entails direct welfare costs. 
We compare this scenario with a situation in which the 
government gives up the ability to inflate debt away, e.g. 
by issuing foreign currency debt or joining a monetary 
union with an anti-inflationary stance. We find that the 
benefits of giving up this adjustment margin outweigh the 
costs, both for our preferred calibration and for a wide 
range of parameter values. This remains true even if a 
‘conservative’ central banker is appointed.
Introduction
One of the main legacies of the 2007-9 financial crisis 
and the subsequent recession has been the emergence 
of large fiscal deficits across the industrialized world. 
The consequence has been a sharp increase in 
government debt, with debt-to-GDP ratios near or 
above record levels in countries such as the United 
States, United kingdom, Japan or the Euro area 
periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain). 
Before the summer of 2012, Euro area periphery 
economies experienced dramatic spikes in their 
sovereign yields, whereas other highly indebted 
countries did not. Many observers emphasized that a 
key difference between the two groups of countries 
was that, whereas the US, Uk and Japan had the 
option to inflate away the real burden of nominal debt, 
the Euro countries were forced to repay debt solely 
through fiscal surpluses. At the same time, the 
experience of a number of developing countries such 
as Mexico or Brazil, in which sovereign debt is often 
issued directly in foreign currency, illustrates situations 
in which governments sometimes renounce the 
possibility of inflating away their debts.
These developments raise the question as to what role 
monetary policy should have, if any, in guaranteeing 
the sustainability of sovereign debt, in view of the 
existing trade-offs between the latter and price 
stability. Broadly speaking, on the one hand it can be 
argued that central banks should provide a ‘monetary 
1  This view is shared e.g. by Krugman (2011) or De Grauwe 
(2011).
2  Our paper relates to recent theoretical papers that analyze the 
link between sovereign debt vulnerability and monetary 
policy, such as Aguiar et al. (2013), Corsetti and Dedola 
(2014), Camous and Cooper (2014), and Bacchetta, Perazzi 
and van Wincoop (2015). These papers consider self-
fulfilling debt crises along the lines of Calvo (1988) or Cole 
and Kehoe (2000). We complement this literature by 
considering a framework in which sovereign default is 
instead an optimal government decision based on 
fundamentals, in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).
3  In technical terms, the model describes a continuous-time 
game between a benevolent government (i.e. one that 
maximizes social welfare) and a set of risk-neutral 
international investors pricing the risky sovereign bonds.
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reduces the real value of debt; ceteris paribus, this 
improves sovereign debt sustainability by making 
default a less likely outcome. On the other hand, 
inflation entails a direct welfare cost. Moreover, 
expectations of future inflation worsen this trade-off by 
raising nominal yields for new bond issuances, thus 
making primary deficits more costly to finance.
We calibrate our model to capture some salient features 
of the EMU periphery economies, including their 
observed inflation record prior to joining the euro and 
their external sovereign debt-to-GDP ratio during the 
euro period.4 In this case the government allows for 
relatively high inflation rates at debt ratios for which 
default is still perceived as rather distant by investors. 
We refer to this baseline scenario as the ‘inflationary 
regime’.
We then compare the baseline inflationary regime with 
a scenario in which inflation is zero at all times. In other 
words, the government effectively renounces the 
possibility of inflating debt away. Given our assumption 
that the government cannot make credible inflation 
commitments, this ‘no inflation’ regime is best 
interpreted as a situation in which the government 
directly issues foreign currency debt, or in which it joins 
a monetary union with a very strong and credible anti-
inflationary stance.
Results
The blue lines in Figure 1 display the equilibrium in the 
inflationary regime as a function of the model’s state 
variable, the external sovereign debt-to-GDP ratio. As 
shown in the last panel, inflation increases roughly 
linearly with the debt ratio, as higher indebtedness 
increases the government’s incentive to inflate the 
debt away. Close to the default threshold, inflation 
increases steeply as the government tries to avoid 
default. Nominal interest rates on bonds (second 
panel) increase gently with debt as investors expect 
higher inflation during the bond’s life. As the economy 
approaches default, investors start perceiving default 
as rather imminent, and bond prices fall steeply 
towards their value at default (which depends mostly 
on their recovery value following default). Also, the 
primary deficit decreases gradually with debt, as bond 
prices fall and deficits become more costly to finance; 
this process is intensified as debt approaches its 
4  Notice that the calibration targets external, rather than total, 
sovereign debt, consistently with the model’s assumption that 
sovereign debt is fully held by foreign investors.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations. Welfare expressed in percent of permanent 
consumption.
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conclusions
Taken together, our results offer an important 
qualification of the conventional wisdom that individual 
countries may benefit from retaining the option to 
inflate away their sovereign debt. In particular, our 
analysis suggests that such countries may actually be 
better off by renouncing this tool if their governments 
are unable to make credible commitments about their 
future inflation policy. This qualification may be relevant 
for most EMU peripheral economies, in view of their 
inflation record (relative e.g. to that of Germany) in the 
decades prior to joining the euro. Our findings may also 
rationalize why a number of developing countries with 
limited inflation credibility typically resort to issuing 
debt in terms of a hard foreign currency.
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default threshold and bond prices start collapsing, 
with deficits turning quickly into a (large) surplus.
As shown in the top panel, social welfare in the no-
inflation regime (red lines) is higher than in the 
inflationary regime at any debt ratio. The reason is that 
the no-inflation regime avoids the welfare costs of 
inflation while not compromising too much the 
sustainability of sovereign debt. On the one hand, the 
inflationary regime creates relatively high levels of 
inflation even when debt is still relatively low and hence 
default is still perceived as rather distant by investors; 
this temptation to inflate disappears in the no-inflation 
regime. On the other hand, the debt elimination effect 
(the only benefit of inflation in the model) is mostly 
undone by the fall in nominal bond prices, or equivalently 
the increase in nominal bond yields, vis-à-vis the no-
inflation regime. Higher yields in turn reflect the fact 
that the higher inflation premia under the inflationary 
regime clearly dominate the lower default premia. With 
the debt elimination channel weakened, the direct 
welfare costs of inflation become the dominant effect 
on welfare outcomes. As a consequence, the 
inflationary regime produces a significant loss in welfare 
relative to the no-inflation scenario.5
Moreover, even at relatively high debt ratios, the 
beneficial effects of inflation on debt sustainability are 
largely undone by the increase in nominal yields due to 
higher inflation expectations. As a result, the no-
inflation regime performs better even when the 
economy is close to default.
Finally, as an alternative to giving up the inflation margin 
altogether, we investigate an intermediate arrangement 
in which the government delegates monetary policy to 
an independent central banker with a greater distaste 
for inflation than society as a whole.6 We find that 
delegating monetary policy to such a ‘conservative’ 
central banker achieves superior welfare outcomes vis-
à-vis the baseline inflationary regime, in which the 
benevolent government chooses inflation discretionarily. 
As it turns out, however, the no inflation regime is still 
preferable to delegating monetary policy to a 
conservative central banker, no matter how ‘hawkish’ 
the latter is.
5  On average, the welfare losses in the inflationary regime 
relative to the no-inflation one are equivalent to a loss of 
almost 0.3% in permanent consumption, which is a first-
order magnitude.
6  Actual social preferences towards inflation (as well as all 
other parameters) remain as in the baseline calibration.
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–  Population ageing implies that there are less 
young people demanding credit. Moreover, 
expected transfers to the old generation  
also fall, raising desired saving, especially if 
sustainability of public debt is dubious to begin 
with.
–  For both of these reasons, as population growth 
falls, the natural interest rate also falls. Given 
the current productivity growth rates registered 
in advanced countries (around 1% TFP growth 
annually), the natural interest rate can be 
significantly negative even with constant 
population. 
–  Higher current productivity growth increases 
savings, because the middle generation can 
pay off the debt it accumulated when young 
using a lower fraction of its income.
–  Higher expected productivity growth decreases 
savings, because both expected income and 
expected transfers to the old generation are 
higher. 
–  A decrease in the price of capital or a higher 
depreciation rate pushes the equilibrium real 
interest rate downwards 
–  The only effects of fiscal policy come through 
its impact on productivity growth or through 
changes in intergenerational transfers. 
Negative equilibrium real interest rates
Assuming that capital depreciates fully in one model 
period (one generation), the model delivers the following 
equation to determine the equilibrium real interest rate 
when the zero lower bound is not binding:
Here, r stands for the real interest rate, b is the time 
preference factor, and a and n are the rates of growth 
of productivity and population, all stated with respect 
to one model period; d and b g are the private and 
public debt-to-GDP ratios, respectively; t is the tax 
LONG-LastING cONsEquENcEs OF thE EurOpEaN crIsIs
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There is a growing concern about the fragility of the 
recovery after the Great Recession, particularly in 
Europe. With little margin for fiscal and monetary 
policies to stimulate aggregate demand, due to the 
excessive levels of public debt and the very low nominal 
interest and inflation rates, some new papers have 
been analyzing how “stagnation traps”, or even “a 
secular stagnation trap”, may become plausible.1 
A recent working paper (Jimeno, 2015) argues that this 
unfortunate state of events can be rationalized as the 
result of the interplay between the debt legacy of the 
crisis and the structural factors that have been slowing 
down economic growth since the late 1990s. The 
interactions go both ways: structural factors that slow 
down economic growth in the medium and long-run 
make deleveraging more difficult and costly, while, on 
the other hand, adapting to a low growth scenario is 
complicated by the debt overhang generated by the 
financial crisis. These structural factors are basically 
three. One is the declining working age population in 
many countries, in particular, in Europe. The second is 
population ageing, also expected to be exceptional in 
Europe. Finally, there is some uncertainty about the 
extent to which technological progress can provide 
productivity growth to compensate for the demographic 
trends.
These interactions are illustrated in a simple OLG 
model with three generations. There is a young 
generation that is credit constrained, does not produce, 
and receives no income, and hence consumes what it 
can borrow.  There is a middle generation that provides 
labour, receives all income (labour earnings and capital 
income), pays off debt accumulated while young, and 
saves by purchasing capital, by lending to the young 
generation, and by holding public bonds. Finally, an old 
generation consumes all of its savings (plus interest 
receipts) and government transfers. 
In a nutshell, the main mechanisms that determine the 
effects of deleveraging and supply shocks in this 
framework, some well-known, others less emphasized, 
are the following. 
1+ r t = 
(1+ n t ) [(1+ β) d t + (τ t + 1 + b t + 1 ) (1 + a t + 1)]
β [ α (1- τ t ) - b t  - (1+ a t )
-1
 d t -1 ]
g
g
1  Gianluca Benigno and Luca Fornaro (2015): “Stagnation 
Traps”, manuscript; Gauti B. Eggertsson and Neil R. 
Mehrotra (2014): “A Model of Secular Stagnation”, NBER 
Working Paper 20574.
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growth, the change in the natural rate caused by a 
process of deleveraging (d t < d t −1 ) is
The equation shows that a deleveraging shock causes 
a larger reduction in the real interest rate when the 
disposable income of the middle generation is lower 
(the denominator is proportional to this generation’s 
disposable income after repaying debt and buying 
public bonds). The impact of the deleveraging shock 
on the natural rate is further increased if population or 
productivity growth is decreasing, or if the public debt 
ratio is higher, as all of these factors tend to increase 
savings. Assuming some plausible parameter values 
(a = 2/3, intergenerational transfers of 8% of GDP, 
a = 2%, and d = 0.1), a 10% reduction in the initial 
debt-to-income ratio of the middle generation would 
cause the natural rate to fall by 2 percentage points.
the importance of nominal and real rigidities
If accommodated by monetary policy through a fall in 
the nominal rate, the fall of the natural interest rate has 
no unemployment consequences. As the real rate is 
lower, capital accumulation is higher, and output is at 
its full employment level, inflation is at its target, and 
nominal wages adjust for real wages to reach the level 
compatible with full employment. 
However, suppose instead that monetary policy is unable 
to accommodate a fall in the real interest rate into 
negative territory, either because nominal rates cannot 
fall below zero, or because it is unwilling to pursue 
unconventional measures to raise inflation. In this 
scenario, there will be a persistent shortfall of demand 
and unemployment will be above its equilibrium level. 
The results in this case may vary, depending on whether 
the economy is characterized by nominal or real rigidities. 
In the case of nominal rigidities, an increase in inflationary 
expectations decreases real wages and the real interest 
rate, reducing the gap between the actual and the natural 
interest rate and bringing the economy closer to full 
employment. On the other hand, if real wages are rigid 
downwards, an increase in current inflation leaves real 
wages unchanged, and, therefore unemployment 
remains constant. If continued high unemployment holds 
down inflation expectations, then the economy tends to 
remain stuck in a low-inflation, high unemployment trap. 
In both cases, with nominal or real rigidities, since output 
is determined by expectations about future income and 
rate on total production, and a is the labour elasticity 
of production.
To interpret this equation quantitatively, it helps to 
restate all quantities in annual terms, rather than 
generational terms. Figure 1 gives the steady-state 
(annual) natural interest rate implied by the equation 
above for alternative population and productivity 
growth rates and debt-to-income ratios, under 
plausible values for the rest of the parameters (time 
discount rate 2% per annum, intergenerational 
transfers of 8% of GDP and a labour share of 2/3). The 
figure compares two levels of private-sector 
indebtedness: d = 0.05 versus d = 0.1. In annual terms, 
d can be interpreted as the fraction of annual income 
dedicated to debt service by the middle-aged 
generation. Thus, we see in the figure that with low 
productivity growth (1% per annum) and low private-
sector indebtedness, the natural rate can reach 
significant negative values even when the population 
growth rate is not especially low.2
r t+1- r t = 
(1+ n ) (1+ α ) ( 1 + β ) (d t - d t-1) / d t-1
[α (1- τ ) - b g ] (1+ a ) / d t - 1 -1β
2  The calculations assume that the young accumulate debt, and 
the middle-aged decumulate debt, at an average rate of 5% or 
10% of GDP each year, and that the model period represents 
30 years. Ignoring interest rate effects, for simplicity, the 
peak debt level reached at the moment of entering 
the working-age population is either 150% or 300% of 
annual GDP. Averaging over the three generations, this 
translates into an aggregate debt ratio of 50% or 100% of 
annual GDP, respectively.
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While Figure 1 shows the steady state implications for 
the real interest rate, a particular concern in the current 
context is deleveraging. Holding fixed other factors 
such as fiscal policy, population, and productivity 
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expected inflation, if an increase in expected inflation can 
be achieved, output and employment will tend to recover. 
Why fiscal policy is constrained
As noted above, in this simple OLG model the 
only effects of fiscal policy go through its impact on 
productivity growth or through changing intergenerational 
transfers. When the ratio of public debt to GDP is too 
high and is expected to decrease in the future, there is 
little scope for increasing transfers from the middle-aged 
to the old generation, especially if population growth is 
low. The middle generation then has a strong incentive to 
save, which keeps the equilibrium real interest rate low.
A section in the paper provides some quantitative 
evidence about the scope for intergenerational 
transfers from the middle to the old generation in 
European countries. The evidence relies on a simple 
decomposition of pension expenditures, documented 
in Figure 2: 
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REPLACEMENT RATIO (AVERAGE PENSION/AVERAGE PRODUCTIVITY)
 
where P represents pension expenditures, Y is output, N 
is employment, PopTot is working-age population, PopRet 
represents the number of pensioners, and B is the 
average pension benefit. Hence, pension expenditures 
as a fraction of output equal the ratio of pensioners to 
working-age population, times the ratio of the average 
pension benefit to average labour productivity, divided 
by the employment rate.
Starting from the three main determinants of pension 
expenditures, it is straightforward to compute, given 
population forecasts and assuming a given value for 
the employment rate, how much replacement ratios 
(the ratio B/(Y/N) of the average benefit relative to 
average labour productivity) would be for any given 
level of pension expenditures (as a fraction of GDP). 
Thus, for illustrative purposes, Figure 3 displays the 
change in replacement ratios between 2009 and 2050 
for three different scenarios:
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Of course, what matters for individual savings decisions 
is how income during working age compares with 
income during old age. If labour productivity grows 
sufficiently fast, expected old-age income may be high 
in spite of sizeable reductions in replacement ratios like 
those calculated above. But insofar as productivity 
growth remains low, savings incentives will be high and 
the natural rate of interest will be low.
final remarks
The Great Recession and the subsequent European 
crisis have left the European economy in a dismal 
situation. The legacy of these events (high public and 
private debt, high unemployment and competitiveness 
misalignments) will have to be addressed in a context 
of population ageing, lower population growth, and 
uncertain productivity growth. The combination of this 
legacy with plausible future demographic and 
economic prospects suggests that the natural interest 
rate has probably fallen significantly, perhaps to a level 
that monetary policy is unable to accommodate, and 
may remain at that level for a long period. In this 
constrained regime, there can be a permanent shortfall 
of demand that pushes the economy into a high-
unemployment trap.
Among the factors that could raise the natural interest 
rate, only a revival of productivity growth seems to lie 
within the scope of policy. This clearly explains why 
“structural reforms” are back at the top of the policy 
agenda in Europe. But even if structural reforms yield 
higher productivity growth, it seems that, as L. 
Summers has argued, the economy is entering a period 
in which concern with cyclical fluctuations will be minor 
relative to the importance of longer-run trends.
–  Countries will have the same pension 
expenditures (as a fraction of GDP) and  
the same employment rates in 2050 as in  
2009 (M1).
–  Countries will converge to an employment rate of 
65%, while keeping the same pension expenditures 
(as a fraction of GDP) as in 2009 (M2).
–  Countries will converge both in employment 
rates (65%) and in pension expenditures (10% 
of GDP) (M3).
The calculations also consider two alternative 
definitions of the working-age population: from ages 
16 to 64 years (left panel) and from 16 to 69 (right 
panel).
The results suggest that budget balance will require a 
decrease in pensions in many countries, implying that 
savings incentives will remain high, keeping real 
interest rates low. Under the first two scenarios, the 
reductions in replacement ratios are sizeable: around 
10 percentage points if the working population is 
considered to be between 16 and 64 years of age, and 
around 6 percentage points if the working population 
includes those between 16 and 69 years of age. For 
some countries, the picture is less grim: assuming 
pension expenditures converge to 10% of GDP, the 
replacement ratio could rise by as much as 5 
percentage points in some Anglophone countries 
if they set the retirement age at 70 years. But even 
under these conditions, many continental European 
countries (Italy, France, Austria, and Portugal) would 
have to reduce replacement ratios by almost 10 
percentage points. 
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workers contributing the most; and (v) provide different 
investment opportunities, as firms target their different 
needs. Thus, demographic changes can be expected to 
influence real interest rates, inflation and real output in 
the short- and long-term either directly or via their 
effects on expectations about the future course of key 
variables.
changes in the demographic structure affect the 
macroeconomy
In a forthcoming Bank of Spain Working Paper 1528 
(Aksoy et al. 2015), using a panel of 20 OECD countries 
over the period 1970-2007, we analyse how much of 
the variation of key macroeconomic variables can be 
explained by the evolution of each country’s 
demographic structure, represented by share of age 
groups (0-9, 10-19,…, 70+) in the total population. 
Our methodology allows us to measure the short-run 
impact, exploring the heterogeneity across countries, 
and the long-run effects of demographic changes, 
calculated by assessing how the impact of age 
profile changes reverberates through the 
macroeconomy, exploring the interactions between 
our key variables.
We show that the changing age profile across OECD 
countries has economically and statistically significant 
impacts on all key macroeconomic variables and that 
these roughly follow a life-cycle pattern; that is, 
dependent cohorts (both young and old) tend to have 
a negative impact on all real macroeconomic variables, 
including real returns, and add positive inflationary 
pressures in the long run.
We use the United Nations (UN) population predictions 
and our long-run estimates to perform country-specific 
prediction exercises. Firstly we contrast the impact of 
demographic changes during the previous and the 
current decade on trend output growth (See Table 1). 
We find that for all countries in our sample the changes 
in age profile will lead to a statistically (with p-values 
no higher than 6.3%) and economically significant 
drop in trend growth. Average annual real output 
growth is expected to be reduced by 0.99 percentage 
points in Japan, 0.92 in the U.S., and 0.67 in Spain. 
More generally, the expected path of output growth 
and real interest rates from 2000 until 2030, shown in 
dEMOGraphIc structurE aNd MacrOEcONOMIc trENds 
YUNUS AkSOY, HENRIqUE BASSO, TOBIAS GRASL AND RON SMITH 
WORkING PAPER Nº 1528
The disappointing recovery after the crisis has sparked 
renewed concern about the medium-run outlook of 
advanced economies. Lower population growth and its 
impact on labour supply gained widespread prominence. 
In this working paper, we take a more detailed look at this 
issue, identifying the impact of the evolution of 
demographic structure –the entire age profile– on the 
macroeconomy. Age profile changes have significant 
implications for savings, investment, real interest rates, 
and growth, and also affect innovation activities. The 
population ageing predicted for the next decades is 
found to be a significant factor in reducing output growth 
and real interest rates across OECD countries.
Introduction
The demographic age profiles in OECD economies are 
changing significantly. The average proportion of the 
population aged 60+ is projected to increase from 
16% in 1970 to 29% in 2030, with most of the 
corresponding decline experienced in the 0-19 age 
group. Demographic changes, in particular their effect 
on labour supply, are often mentioned as one of the 
‘headwinds’ of the observed slowdown in 
macroeconomic performance in advanced economies 
(Gordon 2012, 2014; Fernald and Jones 2014). 
Although important, this interpretation restricts the 
analysis of the impact of demographic changes on the 
macroeconomy. We take a more general and more 
detailed look at demographics, arguing that changes 
in the demographic structure, defined as the variations 
in proportions of the population in each age group 
from year to year, matter for macroeconomic activity 
and may also be related to innovation.
how is the demographic structure relevant?
The demographic structure may affect short- and long-
term macroeconomic conditions through several 
channels. Different age groups (i) have different savings 
behaviour, according to the lifecycle hypothesis; (ii) 
have different productivity levels, according to the age 
profile of wages; (iii) work different amounts – the very 
young and very old tend not to work, with implications 
for labour input; (iv) contribute differently to the 
innovation process, with young and middle-aged 
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demographics, innovation and medium-run economic 
performance
We also develop a theoretical model to match the life 
cycle characteristics observed empirically and to study 
the main mechanisms through which demographic 
changes affect the macroeconomy. The economic 
environment incorporates (i) life cycle properties, with 
three generations in the population (dependent young, 
workers and retirees); (ii) investment in human capital; 
and (ii) endogenous productivity and medium-term 
dynamics. It thus permits analysis of long-term 
interactions of demographic changes with savings, 
investment, and innovation decisions. Changing age 
profiles affect the macroeconomy through three distinct 
channels. First, changes in fertility and workers’ 
available resources affect investment in human capital 
and labour supply. Second, ageing affects the saving 
decision of workers. Finally, the share of young workers 
impacts the innovation process positively and, as a 
result, a change in the demographic profile that skews 
the distribution of the population to the right leads to a 
decline in innovation activity. The link between 
demographics and innovation is crucial in matching our 
empirical findings.
Our simulation results show that:
–  A relative increase in the share of young 
dependents and retirees decreases output 
growth and investment, while an increase in 
workers does the opposite.
–  A permanent increase in longevity (an increase 
in life expectancy) leads to increased growth 
rates in the short term as the decrease in the 
marginal propensity for workers to consume 
leads to a lower real interest rate and an 
increase in innovative activity. However, as the 
share of young workers decreases, productivity 
in innovation decreases, leading to permanently 
lower output growth and investment.
–  Feeding UN population predictions for different 
countries into our model, we match the 
predictions of the empirical model well.
conclusions
Our empirical and theoretical results indicate that the 
current trend of population ageing and reduced fertility, 
expected to continue in the next decades, may contribute 
Figure 1 for selected countries, highlights the 
downward pressure on real rates and output growth as 
a result of the decrease in working-age population and 
the increase in the proportion of retirees expected 
during this period.
Finally, we show that demographic structure also 
affects innovation. Greater proportions of young 
dependents and older generations affect the number 
of patent applications per capita negatively, whereas 
working-age groups (20-60) contribute positively. 
Moreover, within the working age population, young 
and middle aged workers (20-29 and 40-49) contribute 
the most, in line with the evidence in Jones (2010) and 
Feyrer (2008). Using these long-term estimates and 
UN population predictions we find that the expected 
aging in the next two decades may lead to a drop in 
patent applications per capita across OECD countries 
of around 20%.
                                        
 2000-
2009 
 2010-
2019  Change 
 Prob. 
(Change > 0)
Australia       1,64% 0,95% -0,69% 0,050
Austria         2,05% 1,37% -0,68% 0,038
Belgium         2,03% 1,28% -0,75% 0,056
Canada          1,57% 0,45% -1,12% 0,047
Denmark         1,20% 0,64% -0,57% 0,041
Finland         1,23% 0,18% -1,05% 0,051
France          1,57% 0,73% -0,83% 0,054
Germany         1,66% 0,76% -0,91% 0,048
Greece          1,50% 0,88% -0,63% 0,059
Iceland         2,56% 1,77% -0,80% 0,043
Ireland         3,59% 2,83% -0,76% 0,061
Italy           1,83% 1,23% -0,60% 0,053
Japan           0,92% -0,07% -0,99% 0,050
Luxembourg      1,98% 1,62% -0,37% 0,044
Netherlands     0,51% -0,55% -1,06% 0,046
New Zealand     2,64% 1,87% -0,78% 0,043
Norway          2,77% 2,16% -0,61% 0,042
Portugal        2,19% 1,38% -0,80% 0,043
Spain           1,42% 0,75% -0,67% 0,063
Sweden          0,44% 0,05% -0,39% 0,048
Switzerland     1,54% 0,77% -0,77% 0,042
United Kingdom  1,83% 1,43% -0,40% 0,044
United States   1,93% 1,00% -0,92% 0,051
AVERAGE PREDICTED IMPACT ON GDP 
GROWTH BY CONTRY 
TABLE 1 
SOURCE: Author´s calculations.
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to reduced output growth and real interest rates across 
OECD economies. Therefore, the next decades may 
witness a shift in the focus of economic policy from 
short-run stabilisation, which characterised the 1990s 
and most of 2000s, to medium-run economic 
performance.
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RECENT wORkiNG PAPERS
LINK tO WOrKING papErs paGE
EMpLOYMENt prOtEctION LEGIsLatION aNd LaBOr cOurt 
actIVItY IN spaIN
JUAN F. JIMENO, MARTA MARTíNEz-MATUTE  
AND JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI
WORkING PAPER Nº 1507
Labor courts may introduce a significant wedge 
between “legal” firing costs and “effective” (post-trial) 
firing costs. Apart from procedural costs, there is 
uncertainty over judges’ rulings, in particular over the 
likelihood of a “fair” dismissal ultimately being ruled as 
“unfair”, which may increase firing costs significantly. 
In 2010 and 2012, reforms of Employment Protection 
Legislation widened the definition of fair economic 
dismissals in Spain. In this paper we look at Labor 
Court rulings on dismissals across Spanish provinces 
before and after the EPL reforms (2004-2014). We 
make this comparison taking into account a set of co-
variates (local labor market conditions, characteristics 
of the Labor Courts, pre-trial conciliations, congestion 
of Labor Courts) which may determine the selection of 
dismissal cases ruled by Labor Courts. Our results 
suggest that, despite the 2010 and 2012 EPL reforms, 
the proportion of economic redundancies being ruled 
as fair by Labor Courts has not substantially increased, 
although it is now less negatively associated with the 
local unemployment rate than in the pre-reform period.
FIscaL tarGEts. a GuIdE tO FOrEcastErs?
JOAN PAREDES, JAVIER J. PéREz AND GABRIEL PEREz-qUIRÓS
WORkING PAPER Nº 1508
Should rational agents take into consideration 
government policy announcements? A skilled agent 
(an econometrician) could set up a model to combine 
the following two pieces of information in order to 
anticipate the future course of fiscal policy in real-time: 
(i) the ex-ante path of policy as published/announced 
by the government; (ii) incoming, observed data on the 
actual degree of implementation of ongoing plans. We 
formulate and estimate empirical models for a number 
of EU countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) to 
show that government (consumption) targets convey 
useful information about ex-post policy developments 
when policy changes significantly (even if past 
credibility is low) and when there is limited information 
about the implementation of plans (e.g. at the beginning 
of a fiscal year). In addition, our models are instrumental 
in unveiling the current course of policy in real time. Our 
approach complements a well-established branch of 
the literature that finds politically motivated biases in 
policy targets.
MONItOrING thE WOrLd BusINEss cYcLE
MAxIMO CAMACHO AND JAIME MARTINEz-MARTIN
WORkING PAPER Nº 1509
We propose a Markov-switching dynamic factor model 
to construct an index of global business cycle conditions, 
for performing short-term forecasts of quarterly world 
GDP growth in real time and computing real-time 
business cycle probabilities. To overcome the real-time 
forecasting challenges, the model takes into account 
mixed frequencies, asynchronous data publication and 
leading indicators. Our pseudo real-time results show 
that this approach provides reliable and timely inferences 
of quarterly world growth and of the state of the world 
business cycle on a monthly basis.
VOLatILItY-rELatEd EXchaNGE tradEd assEts:  
aN EcONOMEtrIc INVEstIGatION
JAVIER MENCíA AND ENRIqUE SENTANA
WORkING PAPER Nº 1510
We compare semi-nonparametric expansions of the 
Gamma distribution with alternative Laguerre 
expansions, showing that they substantially widen the 
range of feasible moments of positive random variables. 
Then we combine those expansions with a component 
version of the Multiplicative Error Model to capture the 
mean reversion typical in positive but stationary financial 
time series. Finally, we carry out an empirical application 
in which we compare various asset allocation strategies 
for Exchange Traded Notes tracking VIx futures indices, 
which are increasingly popular but risky financial 
instruments. We show the superior performance of the 
strategies based on our econometric model.
puBLIcatIONs 
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destination doubles if it belongs to the same community 
of any of the firm’s previous destinations. The 
introduction of the network-based community variable 
improves the accuracy of the model by up to 19% 
relative to a model that only includes gravity variables. 
Industry-specific communities and general communities 
play similar roles in determining the dynamics of 
Mexican exporters’ country portfolios.
dEFauLt NEar-thE-dEFauLt-pOINt: thE VaLuE OF  
aNd thE dIstaNcE tO dEFauLt
ALFREDO IBáñEz
WORkING PAPER Nº 1514
We show that the default event defined by endogenous 
credit-risk models (i.e. low asset values) can likewise be 
described in terms of low equity prices and negative net 
cash- flows (high debt service and/or negative earnings). 
Specifically, distance-to-default (DD), a volatility-adjusted 
measure of leverage, is given by the ratio of equity prices 
to negative net cash flows. This implies that the probability 
of default is the probability of this ratio becoming small, 
which then depends on the path of these two variables. 
This helps to explain why just equity prices (price per 
share, past return, and volatility) and firm’s debt and 
profitability are significant in reduced-form models that 
predict default while Merton’s DD becomes redundant if 
we control for them [Campbell et al. (2008)]. In 
endogenous models, default is triggered by depressed 
equity prices and a negative flow to shareholders (rather 
than low asset value). And, inversely, default concerns 
are readily lessened by easing refinancing costs (e.g. 
sovereigns for which default is costly and which regularly 
roll over their debts), lowering the principal (underwater 
mortgages or subprime consumer loans, which increases 
equity value), or raising equity (troubled banks).
FIscaL cONsOLIdatION aFtEr thE GrEat rEcEssION:  
thE rOLE OF cOMpOsItION
IVáN kATARYNIUk AND JAVIER VALLéS
WORkING PAPER Nº 1515
We have examined the fiscal consolidation episodes in 
a group of OECD countries from 2009 to 2014. The 
range of the estimated short-term fiscal multiplier runs 
from 1.2% to 2% of GDP, larger than those obtained in 
more “normal times”, implying that the contractionary 
effect has been greater in depressed environments. 
Nevertheless, we have also found that revenue 
measures have a higher and more persistent real impact 
than expenditure measures, which is more consistent 
with the literature and suggests that expenditure cuts 
are less harmful for the economy than tax hikes.
FINaNcIaL INNOVatION IN sOVErEIGN BOrrOWING  
aNd puBLIc prOVIsION OF LIquIdItY
PATRICIA GÓMEz-GONzáLEz
WORkING PAPER Nº 1511
This paper studies how financial innovation in sovereign 
debt markets can increase a country’s level of private 
investment and welfare. I propose a model where 
public debt has a liquidity purpose for the domestic 
private sector and is demanded as a saving vehicle by 
more patient international investors. The public bond is 
risky, it has a low (high) return when the government’s 
fiscal capacity is low (high), but the government cannot 
strategically default on it. The main result of the paper 
is that the government can increase private investment 
by increasing the number of assets supplied, tranching 
its fiscal capacity, and issuing a safe and a risky bond. 
The risky bond is held only by international investors 
and the domestic private sector demands the safe 
bonds. Safe bonds lower the cost of liquidity hoarding 
for the private sector which enables it to increase 
investment. I test the predictions of the model using a 
dataset on public debt and local currency sovereign 
debt ownership for a group of emerging economies. I 
find that domestic collateral constraints are key 
determinants of the shares held abroad of total public 
debt and especially of relatively riskier debt instruments 
(local currency debt).
thE BaNK LENdING chaNNEL OF uNcONVENtIONaL 
MONEtarY pOLIcY: thE IMpact OF thE VLtrOs ON crEdIt 
suppLY IN spaIN
MIGUEL GARCíA-POSADA AND MARCOS MARCHETTI
WORkING PAPER Nº 1512
See Features section.
NEtWOrKs aNd thE dYNaMIcs OF FIrMs’ EXpOrt 
pOrtFOLIO
JUAN DE LUCIO, RAúL MíNGUEz, ASIER MINONDO
AND FRANCISCO REqUENA
WORkING PAPER Nº 1513
We use network-analysis tools to identify communities 
in the web of exporters’ destinations. Our network-
based community measure is purely outcome-based; it 
captures multilateral rather than bilateral dependence 
across countries; and it can be calculated at the 
industry level. We next use our network-based 
community measure as a predictor of additional 
countries chosen by firms expanding their export 
destinations portfolios. Using data on new Mexican 
exporters, the probability of choosing a new export 
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with more re-deployable patent assets. Moreover, we 
show that the credibility of venture capitalist 
commitments to refinance and grow fledgling 
companies is vital for startup debt provision. Following 
a severe and unexpected capital supply shock for VCs, 
we find a striking flight to safety among lenders, who 
continue to finance startups whose investors are better 
able to credibly commit to refinancing their portfolio 
companies, but withdraw from otherwise promising 
projects that may have most needed their funds. The 
findings are consistent with predictions of incomplete 
contracting and financial intermediation theory.
hIGhEr-OrdEr rIsK prEFErENcEs, cONstaNt rELatIVE 
rIsK aVErsION aNd thE OptIMaL pOrtFOLIO aLLOcatION
TRINO-MANUEL ñíGUEz, IVAN PAYA, DAVID PEEL AND JAVIER PEROTE
WORkING PAPER Nº 1520
We derive the conditions for the optimal portfolio 
choice within a constant relative risk aversion type of 
utility function considering alternative probability 
distributions that are able to capture the asymmetric 
and leptokurtic features of asset returns. We illustrate 
the role —beyond risk aversion— played by higher-
order moments in the optimal decision to form a 
portfolio of risky assets. In particular, we show that 
higher-order risk attitudes such as prudence and 
temperance associated with the third and fourth 
moments of the distribution define different optimal 
portfolios than those constrained under risk aversion.
chaNGEs IN FuNdING pattErNs BY LatIN aMErIcaN 
BaNKING sYstEMs: hOW LarGE? hOW rIsKY?
LILIANA ROJAS-SUáREz AND JOSé MARíA SERENA
WORkING PAPER Nº 1521
This paper investigates the shifts in Latin American 
banks’ funding patterns in the postglobal financial crisis 
period. To this end we inroduce a new measure of 
exposure of local banking systems to international debt 
markets that we term: International Debt Issuances by 
Locally Supervised Institutions. In contrast to well-
known BIS measures, our new metric includes all 
entities that fall under the supervisory purview of the 
local authority. This is especially important in Latin 
America, where the participation of foreign banks that 
are established as independent, fully-capitalized entities 
is most substantial. Using this metric we found that all 
types of Latin American banking groups increased 
significantly and sharply their issuance of external debt 
securities. Owing to the low ratios of banks’ external 
debt to total liabilities in the pre-crisis period, solid 
solvency ratios and improved supervisory capacity, the 
ON thE prEdIctaBILItY OF NarratIVE FIscaL 
adJustMENts
PABLO HERNáNDEz DE COS AND ENRIqUE MORAL-BENITO
WORkING PAPER Nº 1516
In an influential paper, Devries et al. (2011) construct 
narrative series of tax- and spending-based fiscal 
adjustments for a panel of OECD countries. In this 
paper, we find that the adjustments based on spending 
cuts can be predicted on the basis of past output 
growth and other macroeconomic variables. Moreover, 
we illustrate that this source of endogeneity may 
generate significant differences in the estimated 
multiplier.
MONEtarY pOLIcY aNd sOVErEIGN dEBt VuLNEraBILItY
GALO NUñO AND CARLOS THOMAS
WORkING PAPER Nº 1517
See Features section.
quaNtItatIVE EFFEcts OF thE shaLE OIL rEVOLutION
CRISTIANA BELU MANESCU AND GALO NUñO
WORkING PAPER Nº 1518
The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of the so-
called “shale oil revolution” on oil prices and economic 
growth. We employ a general equilibrium model of the 
world oil market in which Saudi Arabia is the dominant 
firm, with the rest of the producers as a competitive 
fringe. Our results suggest that most of the expected 
increase in US oil supply due to the shale oil revolution 
has already been incorporated into prices and that it will 
produce an additional increase of 0.2 percent in the GDP 
of oil importers in the period 2010-2018. We also employ 
the model to analyse the collapse in oil prices in the 
second half of 2014 and conclude that it was mainly due 
to positive unanticipated supply shocks.
patENt cOLLatEraL, INVEstOr cOMMItMENt  
aNd thE MarKEt FOr VENturE LENdING
YAEL V. HOCHBERG, CARLOS J. SERRANO
AND ROSEMARIE H. zIEDONIS
WORkING PAPER Nº 1519
This paper investigates the market for lending to 
technology startups (i.e. venture lending) and examines 
two mechanisms that facilitate trade within it: the 
’saleability’ of patent collateral and financial 
intermediaries. We find that intensified trading in the 
secondary market for patent assets increases the 
annual rate of startup lending, particularly for startups 
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responsive to aggregate contractionary shocks, but 
not to expansionary shocks. In particular, contractionary 
demand shocks have a negative effect on short-term 
monetary policy expectations, while contractionary 
supply shocks have a negative effect on medium and 
long-term expectations. Moreover, shocks to different 
economies do not have significantly different effects on 
expectations, although some cross-country differences 
arise.
What drIVEs BaNK-INtErMEdIatEd tradE FINaNcE? 
EVIdENcE FrOM crOss-cOuNtrY aNaLYsIs
JOSé MARíA SERENA GARRALDA AND GARIMA VASISHTHA
WORkING PAPER Nº 1524
Empirical work on the underlying causes of the recent 
dislocations in bank-intermediated trade finance has 
been limited by the scant availability of hard data. This 
paper aims to analyse the key determinants of bank-
intermediated trade finance using a novel dataset 
covering ten banking jurisdictions. It focuses on the 
role of global factors as well as country-specific 
characteristics in driving trade finance. Results indicate 
that country-specific variables, such as growth in trade 
flows and funds available for domestic banks, as well 
as global financial conditions and global import growth, 
are important determinants of trade finance. These 
results are robust to different model specifications. 
Further, we do not find that trade finance is more 
sensitive to global financial conditions than other loans 
to non-bank entities.
Fast ML EstIMatION OF dYNaMIc BIFactOr MOdELs:  
aN appLIcatION tO EurOpEaN INFLatION
GABRIELE FIORENTINI, ALESSANDRO GALESI AND ENRIqUE SENTANA
WORkING PAPER Nº 1525
We generalise the spectral EM algorithm for dynamic 
factor models in Fiorentini, Galesi and Sentana (2014) 
to bifactor models with pervasive global factors 
complemented by regional ones. We exploit the 
sparsity of the loading matrices so that researchers can 
estimate those models by maximum likelihood with 
numerous series from multiple regions. We also derive 
convenient expressions for the spectral scores and 
information matrix, which allows us to switch to the 
scoring algorithm near the optimum. We explore the 
ability of a model with one global factor and three 
regional factors to capture inflation dynamics across 25 
European countries in the period 1999-2014.
recent increase in banks’ external indebtedness has not 
resulted in financial difficulties and banking systems 
remain strong. However, a preliminary analysis of risks 
based on this new trend reveals the emergence of 
several signs of increased vulnerability. First, in some 
banking groups (particularly in Brazilian banks, domestic 
and foreign alike) the increased issuance of external 
debt has been accompanied by a greater reliance on 
wholesale funding. In contrast, reliance on wholesale 
funding by Colombian banks has remained low and 
stable. Second, rollover risks have significantly 
increased for Latin American banking groups. Maturing 
debt, which increased significantly in 2013-14, will 
continue at high levels in 2015-16 in the context of 
major uncertainties in international capital markets. This 
risk is especially noticeable in Brazil and Chile, whose 
ratios of maturing debt to total debt are high. Third, in 
spite of a sizeable accumulation of international 
reserves, the large increase in banks’ external debt 
might have contributed to reducing the resilience of 
central banks to deal with a severe adverse shock. 
LONG-LastING cONsEquENcEs OF thE EurOpEaN crIsIs
JUAN F. JIMENO
WORkING PAPER Nº 1522
See Features section.
cOuNtrY shOcKs, MONEtarY pOLIcY EXpEctatIONs aNd 
EcB dEcIsIONs. a dYNaMIc NON-LINEar apprOach
MAxIMO CAMACHO, DANILO LEIVA-LEON  
AND GABRIEL PEREz-qUIROS
WORkING PAPER Nº 1523
Previous studies have shown that the effectiveness of 
monetary policy largely depends on market 
expectations about future policy actions. This paper 
proposes an econometric framework to address the 
effect of the current state of the economy on monetary 
policy expectations. Specifically, we study the effect of 
contractionary (or expansionary) demand (or supply) 
shocks hitting the euro area countries on the 
expectations about the ECB’s monetary policy in two 
stages. In the first stage, we construct indices of real 
activity and inflation dynamics for each country, based 
on soft and hard indicators. In the second stage, we 
use those indices to provide assessments of the type 
of aggregate shock hitting each country and assess its 
effect on monetary policy expectations at different 
horizons. Our results indicate that expectations are 
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FiNANCiAl STABiliTy JOuRNAl
The Financial Stability Journal (Revista de Estabilidad 
Financiera) is published biannually by the Banco de 
España, with the aim of disseminating and participating 
in discussions on issues related to financial stability, 
with special emphasis on regulation and prudential 
supervision. Its board of editors comprises internal and 
external professionals. All articles appearing in the 
journal, which may be authored by Banco de España 
staff or researchers from other institutions, are refereed 
by at least one member of the board of editors.
hIstOrY OF BaNKING rEGuLatION as dEVELOpEd BY thE 
BasEL cOMMIttEE ON BaNKING supErVIsION 1974-2014 
(BrIEF OVErVIEW)
HENRY PENIkAS 
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 28, MAYO 2015, 9-48.
This paper analyses in detail the regulatory activity of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) –a key 
part of the recent history of banking regulation– on the 
occasion of its 40th anniversary. Based on documents 
published between 1974 and 2014, it classifies the 
regulatory activity into five major stages. It also provides 
data describing the Committee’s activity (number of 
documents published, average consultation period, 
number of comments received, etc.) which show, for 
example, which countries and institutions have been 
most active in sending comments. It analyses 
developments in regulatory activity by area and concludes 
by making several recommendations, including the need 
to improve cooperation between the BCBS and the 
academic community so that the latest research is 
incorporated more rapidly. 
La rEcIENtE EVOLucIóN dEL GOBIErNO cOrpOratIVO  
dE Las ENtIdadEs dE crédItO
JAIME HERRERO 
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 28, MAYO 2015, 49-74.
This paper analyses the main components of corporate 
governance at Spanish banks. It examines its previous 
situation and its evolution, focusing on those less 
positive features that might have been involved in the 
emergence of the recent financial crisis. It goes on to 
describe the main regulatory changes introduced in the 
area of corporate governance in recent years and 
highlights certain improvements to governance which 
should be implemented by banks to ensure that 
banking activity is conducted properly. These 
improvements would also contribute to raising the 
sEcurItIzatION aNd assEt prIcEs
YUNUS AkSOY AND HENRIqUE S. BASSO
WORkING PAPER Nº 1526
We investigate the link between securitization and 
asset prices and show that increases in the growth rate 
of the volume of ABS issuance lead to a sizable decline 
in bond and equity premia. Furthermore, we show that 
in a model where banks select their portfolio of assets 
and create synthetic securities, the compensation for 
undertaking risk decreases as securitization increases. 
The pooling and tranching of credit assets relaxes both 
the funding and the risk constraints banks face allowing 
them to increase balance sheet holdings. Accordingly, 
the drop in risk premium may be unrelated to a decline 
in actual risk.
thE GrEat MOdEratION IN hIstOrIcaL pErspEctIVE.  
Is It that GrEat?
MARíA DOLORES GADEA, ANA GÓMEz-LOSCOS  
AND GABRIEL PEREz-qUIROS
WORkING PAPER Nº 1527
The Great Moderation (GM) is widely documented in 
the literature as one of the most important changes in 
the US business cycle. All the papers that analyze it 
use post-WWII data. In this paper, we set the GM for 
the first time against a long-dated historical backdrop, 
stretching back a century and a half, which includes 
secular changes in the economic structure and a 
substantial reduction of output volatility. We find two 
robust structural breaks in volatility at the end of WWII 
and in the mid-eighties, showing that the GM still holds 
in the longer perspective. Furthermore, we show that 
GM volatility reduction is only linked to expansion 
features. We also date the US business cycle in the 
long run, finding that volatility plays a primary role in 
the definition of the business cycle, which has 
important consequences for econometricians and 
forecasters.
dEMOGraphIc structurE aNd MacrOEcONOMIc trENds
YUNUS AkSOY, HENRIqUE S. BASSO, RON P. SMITH  
AND TOBIAS GRASL
WORkING PAPER Nº 1528
See Features section.
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RECENT PuBliCATiONS  
iN REFEREED JOuRNAlS
a tOOLKIt tO strENGthEN GOVErNMENt BudGEt 
surVEILLaNcE
D. J. PEDREGAL, J. J. PéREz AND A. J. SáNCHEz-FUENTES
HACIENDA PúBLICA ESPAñOLA - REVIEW OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 211 (4), 
2014, 117-146
EL MItO dE La EspEcIaLIzacIóN JudIcIaL
G. DOMéNECH AND J. S. MORA-SANGUINETTI
INDRET 1,  
JANUARY 2015, 1-32
WaGE dYNaMIcs IN thE prEsENcE OF uNOBsErVEd 
INdIVIduaL aNd JOB hEtErOGENEItY
L. HOSPIDO
LABOUR ECONOMICS 33,  
APRIL 2015, 81-93
a tWIN crIsIs WIth MuLtIpLE BaNKs OF IssuE:  
spaIN IN thE 1860s
A. MORO, G. NUñO AND P. TEDDE
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF ECONOMIC HISTORY 19 (2),  
MAY 2015, 171-194
caN WE usE sEasONaLLY adJustEd INdIcatOrs  
IN dYNaMIc FactOr MOdELs?
M. CAMACHO, Y. LOVCHA, AND G. PéREz-qUIRÓS
STUDIES IN NONLINEAR DYNAMICS AND ECONOMETRICS 19 (3),  
JUNE 2015, 377-391
dIsENtaNGLING cONtaGION aMONG sOVErEIGN cds 
sprEads durING thE EurOpEaN dEBt crIsIs
C. BROTO AND G. PéREz qUIRÓS
JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL FINANCE 32,  
JUNE 2015, 165-179
pEEr EFFEcts IN JudIcIaL dEcIsIONs: EVIdENcE FrOM 
spaNIsh LaBOur cOurts
á. MARTíN-ROMáN, A. MORAL, AND M. MARTíNEz-MATUTE
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 42,  
JUNE 2015, 20-37
levels of transparency and of shareholder, investor and 
customer knowledge and confidence in credit 
institutions, a key factor in the appropriate conduct of 
banking business. 
La rEFOrMa dE La pOst-cONtratacIóN dE VaLOrEs  
EN España
JESúS BENITO NAVEIRA AND IGNACIO SOLLOA MENDOzA 
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 28, MAYO 2015, 75-102.
This paper describes the securities post-trading sector 
in Europe and Spain. This sector is an essential part of 
securities market operations and has been subject to 
an intensive reform process in recent years through 
initiatives such as TARGET2 Securities (T2S). In Spain, 
specific features of domestic practice have prompted a 
far-reaching reform. Noteworthy are the introduction of 
a central counterparty (CCP) – BME Clearing – in the 
equities clearing and settlement process and changes 
made to Iberclear to replace Referencias de Registro 
(RRs) in order to adapt to the European environment. 
The paper analyses both aspects in detail. 
crEdIt aNd LIquIdItY rIsK IN sOVErEIGN BONds
áLVARO MARTíN HERRERO AND JAVIER MENCíA 
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 28, MAYO 2015, 103-124
This paper presents a quantitative study on the increase 
in the sovereign bond yields of France, the Netherlands, 
Germany and Spain and their breakdown into the credit 
and liquidity risk components. It uses data from January 
2007 to February 2014, thus capturing two periods of 
stress: the financial crisis and the sovereign crisis. It 
concludes that, in general, the credit effect dominates, 
although in certain countries it is alleviated by the 
liquidity premia arising from the safe-haven flows 
characteristic of periods of hectic financial episodes. 
Additionally, it identifies a common European credit 
effect which makes it possible to distinguish 
idiosyncratic credit patterns. 
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dO LaWYErs INducE LItIGatION? EVIdENcE FrOM spaIN, 
2001-2010
J. S. MORA-SANGUINETTI AND N. GAROUPA
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 44, 
OCTOBER 2015, 29-41
EstIMatION OF rEGuLatOrY crEdIt rIsK MOdELs
C. PéREz MONTES
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH 48 (2), 
OCTOBER 2015, 161-191
rIsK FactOrs aNd thE MaturItY OF suBNatIONaL dEBt: 
aN EMpIrIcaL INVEstIGatION FOr thE casE OF spaIN
J. J. PéREz AND R. PRIETO
PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW 43 (6), 
NOVEMBER 2015, 786-815
quaNtItatIVE EFFEcts OF thE shaLE OIL rEVOLutION
C. B. MănesCu anD G. nuño 
ENERGY POLICY 86, 
NOVEMBER 2015, 855-866
MONItOrING thE WOrLd BusINEss cYcLE
M. CAMACHO AND J. MARTíNEz-MARTíN
ECONOMIC MODELLING 51,  
DECEMBER 2015, 617-625
FORThCOmiNG ARTiClES  
iN REFEREED JOuRNAlS
EXtractING NON LINEar sIGNaLs FrOM sEVEraL 
EcONOMIc INdIcatOrs
M. CAMACHO, G. PéREz-qUIRÓS, AND P. PONCELA
JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS
GrOWth EMpIrIcs IN paNEL data uNdEr MOdEL 
uNcErtaINtY aNd WEaK EXOGENEItY
E. MORAL-BENITO
JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS
MEasurING urBaN aGGLOMEratION. a rEFOuNdatION  
OF thE MEaN cItY-pOpuLatION sIzE INdEX
A. LEMELIN, F. RUBIERA-MOROLLÓN AND A. GÓMEz-LOSCOS
SOCIAL INDICATORS RESEARCH
shOrt-ruN FOrEcastING OF arGENtINE GrOss dOMEstIc 
prOduct GrOWth
M. CAMACHO, M. DAL BIANCO AND J. MARTíNEz-MARTíN
EMERGING MARkETS FINANCE AND TRADE 51 (3),  
JUNE 2015, 473-485
thE FaILurE tO prEdIct thE GrEat rEcEssION–a VIEW 
thrOuGh thE rOLE OF crEdIt
M. D. GADEA RIVAS AND G. PéREz-qUIRÓS
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 13 (3),  
JUNE 2015, 534-559
thE saFEtY aNd sOuNdNEss EFFEcts OF BaNK M&a IN  
thE Eu: dOEs prudENtIaL rEGuLatION haVE aNY IMpact?
J. HAGENDORFF AND M. J. NIETO
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 21 (3),  
JUNE 2015, 462-490
tOWard a MOrE rELIaBLE pIcturE OF thE EcONOMIc 
actIVItY: aN appLIcatION tO arGENtINa
M. CAMACHO, M. DAL BIANCO AND J. MARTíNEz-MARTíN
ECONOMICS LETTERS 132,  
JULY 2015, 129-132
ENtrEprENEurshIp aNd ENFOrcEMENt INstItutIONs: 
dIsaGGrEGatEd EVIdENcE FOr spaIN
M. GARCíA-POSADA AND J. S. MORA-SANGUINETTI
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 40 (1),  
AUGUST 2015, 49-74
rEturNs tO sKILLs aNd thE dIstrIButION OF WaGEs: 
spaIN 1995–2010
R. CARRASCO, J. F. JIMENO AND C. ORTEGA
OxFORD BULLETIN OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 77 (4),  
AUGUST 2015, 542-565
dIstOrtIONs aNd thE sIzE dIstrIButION OF pLaNts: 
EVIdENcE FrOM crOss-cOuNtrY data
M. GARCíA-SANTANA AND R. RAMOS
SERIES - JOURNAL OF THE SPANISH ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 6 (3),  
AUGUST 2015, 279-312
prEcautIONarY prIcE stIcKINEss
J. COSTAIN AND A. NAkOV
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS AND CONTROL 58,  
SEPTEMBER 2015, 218-234
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thE puBLIc sEctOr paY Gap IN a sELEctION OF EurO arEa 
cOuNtrIEs IN thE prE-crIsIs pErIOd
R. GIORDANO, D. DEPALO, M. C. PEREIRA, B. EUGèNE,  
E. PAPAPETROU, J. J. PEREz, L. REISS, AND M. ROTER
HACIENDA PúBLICA ESPAñOLA - REVIEW OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
thE IMpact OF FINaNcIaL rEGuLatION ON currENt 
accOuNt BaLaNcEs
ENRIqUE MORAL-BENITO Y OLIVER ROEHN 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
FIscaL MuLtIpLIErs IN turBuLENt tIMEs:  
thE casE OF spaIN
P. HERNáNDEz DE COS Y ENRIqUE MORAL-BENITO
EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS
Fast ML EstIMatION OF dYNaMIc BIFactOr MOdELs:  
aN appLIcatION tO EurOpEaN INFLatION
G. FIORENTINI, A. GALESI, AND E. SENTANA  
ADVANCES IN ECONOMETRICS
thE cYcLE OF EarNINGs INEquaLItY: EVIdENcE FrOM 
spaNIsh sOcIaL sEcurItY data
S. BONHOMME AND L. HOSPIDO 
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
cOMMONaLItIEs aNd crOss-cOuNtrY spILLOVErs 
IN MacrOEcONOMIc-FINaNcIaL LINKaGEs
M. CICCARELLI, E. ORTEGA AND M. T. VALDERRAMA
THE B.E. JOURNAL OF MACROECONOMICS
spaNIsh puBLIc FINaNcEs thrOuGh thE FINaNcIaL crIsIs
F. MARTí AND J. J. PéREz 
FISCAL STUDIES
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NEwS
JaIME FErNÁNdEz dE araOz prIzE ON cOrpOratE FINaNcE
10 SEPTEMBER 2015
On 10 September 2015, the sixth edition of the Jaime 
Fernández de Araoz Prize was awarded for the paper 
“When credit dries up: Job losses in the Great 
Recession”, by Samuel Bentolila (CEMFI), Marcel 
Jansen (Univ. Autónoma de Madrid), Gabriel Jiménez 
(Banco de España), and Sonia Ruano (Banco de 
España). The prize is granted every other year for 
research in the field of corporate finance. 
The results of the paper, based on balance sheet data 
and bank-loan application data associated with 
170,000 Spanish firms, suggest that firms that relied on 
loans from weaker banks were subsequently obliged to 
downsize (or exit) when the Great Recession arrived. 
The paper is available as CEMFI Working Paper #1310, 
and is currently being reviewed for publication in a 
refereed journal.
The Jaime Fernández de Araoz Prize is sponsored by 
Deutsche Bank España, and was awarded to the 
researchers by H.M. Felipe VI.
prIzEs FOr BaNcO dE España rEsEarch
Two other studies by Banco de España economists 
were also recently singled out by awards for research 
excellence.
The paper “A toolkit to strengthen government budget 
surveillance”, by Diego J. Pedregal (Univ. Castilla-La 
Mancha), Javier J. Pérez (Banco de España), and 
Antonio Jesús Sánchez-Fuentes (Univ. Complutense 
de Madrid) was awarded the Alexandre Pedrós Prize 
for 2014, granted by the Societat Economica 
Barcelonesa D´Amics del País. This prize recognizes 
the best article published in Hacienda Pública Española 
/ Review of Public Economics each year, as selected 
by the editorial board of the journal. 
The paper “Heterogeneous responses to effective tax 
enforcement: Evidence from Spanish firms”, by Miguel 
Almunia (Univ. of Warwick) and David López-Rodríguez 
(Banco de España) was awarded the 2015 IIPF Young 
Economists Award. This award, granted by the 
International Institute of Public Finance, recognizes 
up to three papers presented at the IIPF annual 
congress. An early version of the paper is available as 
Banco de España Working Paper #1419; the current 
version is being reviewed for publication in a refereed 
journal.
RECENT CONFERENCES
LINK tO cONFErENcEs paGE
EurOpEaN suMMEr sYMpOsIuM IN INtErNatIONaL 
MacrOEcONOMIcs (EssIM 2015)
RODA DE BARá (TARRAGONA), 26-29 MAY 2015
In late May, 2015, the Banco de España hosted the 
twenty-third edition of ESSIM (the European Summer 
Symposium in International Macroeconomics) in its 
facilities at Roda de Bará, in the province of Tarragona. 
The conference is an annual event of the CEPR (Centre 
for Economic Policy Research) which has been co-
organized frequently with the Banco de España. The 
conference is intended as an opportunity for 
macroeconomists from European countries, especially 
younger researchers, to get to know each other and to 
meet key economists from the rest of the world, and to 
establish collaborative research projects. 
The papers presented at the conferences addressed a 
variety of macroeconomic questions, from theoretical, 
empirical and policy-oriented perspectives. Issues 
receiving special attention in 2015 included the 
macroeconomic effects of fiscal adjustments, forward-
looking models of government debt, policy approaches 
in asymmetric monetary unions, policy approaches at 
the zero lower bound, nonconventional instruments for 
central bank policy, and macroeconomic dynamics in 
the presence of financial frictions. 
NEWs aNd EVENts
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Francesco Giavazzi (Universitá Bocconi) participated as 
invited speakers. They discussed issues related to 
citizens’ trust in economic and policy institutions in 
Europe (Algan), the role of exchange rates in 
understanding the gains from wage flexibility (Galí) and 
the optimal sequencing of labor and product market 
reforms (Giavazzi). The conference also included 
sessions on the macroeconomic impact of structural 
reforms, financial markets issues, and coordination 
issues related to structural reforms.
Finally, the policy panel included contributions by Alain 
de Serres (OECD), Marcel Fratzscher (DIW Berlin) and 
Vitor Gaspar (IMF).
RECENT ECONOmiC RESEARCh 
SEmiNARS
LINK tO sEMINars paGE
GENdEr dIFFErENtIaLs IN INs aNd Outs OF uNEMpLOYMENt 
IN thE GrEat rEcEssION IN spaIN
SARA DE LA RICA
Univ. del País Vasco
6 MAY 2015
cOMparING FLat aNd rIsK BasEd capItaL rEquIrEMENts
DAVID MARTíNEz MIERA
Univ. Carlos III de Madrid
13 MAY 2015
thE WOrLd INcOME dIstrIButION: thE EFFEcts  
OF INtErNatIONaL uNBuNdLING OF prOductION
SERGI BASCO
Univ. Carlos III de Madrid
20 MAY 2015
capItaL GOOds, MEasurEd tFp aNd GrOWth:  
thE casE OF spaIN
ANTONIA DíAz
Univ. Carlos III de Madrid
3 JUNE 2015
capItaL rEquIrEMENts IN a quaNtItatIVE MOdEL  
OF BaNKING INdustrY dYNaMIcs
DEAN CORBAE
Univ. of Wisconsin - Madison
16 JUNE 2015
BaNK INtErVENtIONs aNd dOWNsIdE cOrrELatION rIsK 
prEMIuM: EVIdENcE FrOM thE GLOBaL aNd EurO-arEa 
The ESSIM conference also provides an opportunity for 
interaction between Banco de España staff, economists 
from other central banks, and academic researchers. 
Presentations by Banco de España researchers 
included a talk by Henrique Basso (Dept. of Monetary 
and Financial Studies) on the macroeconomic effects 
of changes in an economy’s demographic structure, a 
talk by Galo Nuño (DGA International Affairs) on 
monetary policy and sovereign debt, and a talk by 
James Costain (Dept. of Monetary and Financial 
Studies) on bargaining games between near-rational 
decision-makers. 
4th WOrLd BaNK – BaNcO dE España pOLIcY 
cONFErENcE: thE EcONOMIc chaLLENGEs assOcIatEd 
WIth rIsING (aNd FaLLING) INEquaLItY
MADRID, 8 JUNE 2015
On June 8, the Banco de España hosted its fourth joint 
conference with the World Bank, entitled: “The 
economic challenges associated with rising (and falling) 
inequality”. The goal of this policy conference was to 
bring together academics and policy makers to discuss 
the challenges that inequality represents for modern 
economies. The event included a keynote speech by 
Leandro Prados de la Escosura, where the 
developments in inequality were put in a historical 
perspective, as well as two round table discussions. In 
the first one, Leonardo Gasparini (CEDLAS-Universidad 
Nacional de La Plata), Augusto de la Torre (World Bank) 
and Santiago Levy (Inter-American Development Bank) 
discussed recent developments in inequality in Latin 
America. In the second, Marcelo Olarreaga (Université 
de Genève), Romain Ranciere (Paris School of 
Economics) and Andrea Brandolini (Banca d’Italia) 
elaborated on the macroeconomic implications of 
inequality. 
structuraL rEFOrMs IN thE WaKE OF rEcOVErY:  
WhErE dO WE staNd?
MADRID, 18-19 JUNE 2015
On 18 and 19 June 2015, the Banco de España hosted 
a research conference, jointly organized with Banque 
de France, entitled “Structural reforms in the wake of 
recovery: Where do we stand?”. The conference 
brought together academics and policy makers to 
discuss the aggregate implications of structural 
reforms, both from a theoretical and an empirical 
perspective. 
Yann Algan (Sciences Po Paris), Jordi Galí (UPF), and 
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crIsIs
JUAN-MIGUEL LONDONO
Federal Reserve Board
17 JUNE 2015
thE NEW FINaNcIaL rEGuLatION IN BasEL III aNd MONEtarY 
pOLIcY: a MacrOprudENtIaL apprOach
MARGARITA RUBIO
Univ. of Nottingham
24 JUNE 2015
INtErNatIONaL cOMpEtItIVENEss: prOduct dErEGuLatION 
VErsus INtErNaL dEVaLuatION
CéLINE POILLY
Univ. de Lausanne
1 JULY 2015
thE cOLLatEraL trap
FRéDéRIC BOISSAY
European Central Bank
2 SEPTEMBER 2015
spEcIaLIzatION IN BaNK LENdING: EVIdENcE FrOM 
EXpOrtING FIrMs 
VERONICA RAPPOPORT 
London School of Economics 
16 SEPTEMBER 2015
FIscaL pOLIcY chaLLENGEs FrOM a EurOpEaN pErspEctIVE
LUDGER SCHUkNECHT
Federal Ministry of Finance, Germany
21 SEPTEMBER 2015
prEcautIONarY saVING aNd aGGrEGatE dEMaNd
xAVIER RAGOT
Paris School of Economics
23 SEPTEMBER 2015
MONEtarY-FIscaL pOLIcY MIX WIth FINaNcIaL FrIctIONs
PEDRO GOMES
Univ. Carlos III de Madrid
30 SEPTEMBER 2015
BaNKs arE NOt INtErMEdIarIEs OF LOaNaBLE FuNds – 
aNd WhY thIs MattErs
MICHAEL kUMHOF
Bank of England
7 OCTOBER 2015
LENdING staNdards OVEr thE crEdIt cYcLE
EMANUELE TARANTINO
Univ. of Mannheim
14 OCTOBER 2015
cIss - a pOrtFOLIO-thEOrEtIc FraMEWOrK FOr  
thE cONstructION OF FINaNcIaL strEss INdIcEs
MANFRED kREMER
European Central Bank
20 OCTOBER 2015
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 ReseaRch update, autuMN 2015
PROFilES 
GalO NuÑO
Staff economist (on leave)
International Economics Division
Currently visiting Research Division
pEOpLE
Galo Nuño first joined the International Economics 
Division of the Banco de España in 2009. After two 
years in the International Policy Analysis Division of 
the European Central Bank, where he analyzed the 
macroeconomic impact of oil markets, he returned 
to the Banco de España in 2014. Galo holds a PhD in 
electrical engineering from the Univ. Politécnica de 
Madrid, and an MSc in Management Science and 
Engineering from Stanford University, where he was 
awarded the Outstanding Graduate Prize in his 
program. He has a diverse range of publications in 
influential journals on topics of macroeconomics, 
banking, and finance.
Ru: your background is rather unusual since your 
main degree is in electrical engineering. Tell us 
about the path that led you to become a central 
banker.
Actually an engineering background is not so 
uncommon; many academic economists started 
out in engineering or operations research. 
By the time I moved to Stanford I already had some 
exposure to economics and finance from working 
briefly as a management consultant, and in those 
pre-crisis times (I arrived in 2005) lots of physicists 
and engineers were excited by finance and were 
switching fields. So I joined a rather unique program, 
called Management Science and Engineering, that 
originally grew out of operations research. On one 
hand, it taught finance and economics and 
optimization; also operations research topics 
related to designing manufacturing systems; and 
there were courses about entrepreneurship, finance, 
and day-to-day business skills. I got to take courses 
in the economics department, in the business 
school, and in the engineering school. Then I 
worked for a time at BBVA Research before starting 
at the Banco de España.
Ru: you have done diverse work since you came 
to the Banco de España, including papers on 
research and development, oil markets, sovereign 
crises, banking and macroprudential policies, and 
modeling methods with heterogeneous agents. 
But you also have a fascinating historical study of 
the Spanish banking system during the global 
financial crisis of the 1860s. That period recalls 
recent times, with a twin crisis affecting banks 
and sovereign debt, but it occurred when Spain 
still lacked a central bank. Tell us about how that 
crisis played out.
I was fortunate to work with Pedro Tedde, the 
historian here at the Banco de España, who has 
recently retired. He was the last of a large cohort of 
economic historians working here since the late 
1970s. The Banco de España has amazing archives, 
with information about its balance sheet and its 
board meetings ever since its foundation in the 18th 
century. So there is hard data, and soft data about 
the issues that worried people in those days. 
Nineteenth century balance sheets are fascinating 
because you already had all the main features of a 
modern economy, but the structure was much 
simpler. There were financial crises like we have 
today, but the balance sheets of the banks look like 
textbook examples: you see investment in equity 
and bonds, and financing by deposits, and bonds, 
and capital. Nothing else. So it’s much easier to 
understand.
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Ru: The Banco de España, at that time, was still 
called the Banco de San Carlos?
No. The period we cover in the paper is 1856-1874. 
The Banco de España got its current name in 1856, 
when a new charter was issued, with new 
responsibilities and regulations for all Spanish 
banks. Similar regulations were issued around the 
same time in several countries— including France, 
some German states, and the United kingdom, 
related to the emergence of limited liability in 
banking, and the emergence of universal banking. 
Before the mid-19th century, there were only private 
banks, owned by a few partners who put in their 
own money. But with the construction of the 
railroads, a new kind of bank was needed, which 
could issue shares, and take deposits, and bring in 
sufficient money to fund larger-scale investments. 
Ru: you talk about two types of institutions in your 
paper, the local issuing banks, and the sociedades 
de crédito (credit societies). 
Right. There were two classes of limited-liability 
banks at that time. First, the issuing banks, which 
had the tremendous privilege of issuing bank notes 
in exchange for deposits of bullion. Their main 
business was providing commercial credit, 
discounting bills of trade and so forth. And while 
there were many issuing banks, it was not a “free 
banking” system as in Scotland or the U.S. Only 
one bank of issue was permitted in each city— a 
system of local monopolies. There was a Banco de 
Barcelona, a Banco de Santander, Banco de Cádiz, 
and so forth. And in spite of its name, the Banco de 
España was really just the largest local issuing bank, 
effectively a “Bank of Madrid”. But that gave it the 
advantage of being the main lender to the 
government.
The second class of banks were the sociedades, 
resembling contemporary investment banks, which 
were less regulated. They were not permitted to 
issue bank notes, and their main business was 
industrial investment, especially in railroads. So 
there was a dual system, with one sector more 
regulated than the other, one safer than the other. 
The sociedades were highly competitive— there 
were lots of them, with at least three in Madrid. They 
competed with each other in investment projects, 
and they also tried to muscle in on the business of 
the banks of issue, because they could see the 
profitability of issuing currency. They issued bearer 
bonds that paid a small amount of interest, trying to 
create a sort of pseudo-money. That was 
controversial and arguably illegal.
Then came the crisis of 1864-1866, which has many 
parallels with recent times. Over six years there had 
been a huge economic boom in Spain, mostly 
driven by worldwide money growth due to the 
discovery of gold in California. And domestically the 
boom was concentrated in one sector: at that time 
it was not housing, but railroads. The sociedades 
were highly leveraged by then, and investing in 
railroads, partly because of government subsidies, 
but it was fairly predictable that many of these 
investments would fail. 
Then all of a sudden a global panic raised interest 
rates worldwide, what we would call a “sudden 
stop” today. There were many causes, but the worst 
episode was the fall of a huge London institution 
called Overend & Gurney. The subsequent crisis is 
familiar to English academics, because that is when 
the Bank of England stepped in as a lender of last 
resort, as Walter Bagehot described in his book, 
Lombard Street. 
Ru: what happened in Spain?
The crisis led to a credit freeze, no one wanted to 
lend to Spain, and Spanish investors wanted their 
money back from the banks. The railway assets of 
the sociedades were highly illiquid, and they had 
lots of debt and little capital. So they had no money 
to pay back their creditors, and had to declare 
bankruptcy. There were also spillovers to the banks 
of issue, in spite of their sounder business model. 
And perhaps due to institutional differences, or 
maybe just the ignorance of the authorities, the 
management of the crisis was very different here, 
awful really. On one hand, there was a lot of 
corruption, as overlapping shareholders in the 
issuing banks and sociedades manuevered to place 
losses on the bondholders and depositors. But 
probably the most reckless behavior was by the 
central government itself. It was on a totally 
unsustainable fiscal path, and had no access to 
debt markets, due to its previous unresolved serial 
defaults. So the government decided to force the 
Banco de España to finance it. And the worry at that 
time was not about inflation, but sustainability— 
people worried that the unsustainable government 
debt would bankrupt the Banco de España. 
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Ru: So there was no one available to act as a 
lender of last resort.
True, but not only that. The Banco de España was 
not really at the center of the system, unlike the 
English or French situations. It just saw itself as 
primus inter pares, the largest in the family of local 
banks. And unlike the Bank of England, which 
accepted deposits from other banks, the Banco de 
España had no close relationship with the others. It 
was a very large bank, amounting to half the banking 
system, but it had no wider role. So it was never 
tempted to help the other banks, which it basically 
viewed as competitors. 
But even if it had wished to, the Banco de España 
could not have stabilized the financial system, 
because the government was deliberately draining 
its resources. It sounds crazy to say it, but there 
was a Machiavellian plan. The Spanish government, 
led by Alonso Martínez (who now has a metro 
station named for him) planned to borrow all the 
gold from the Banco de España, then force it into 
bankruptcy, and then grant a new monopoly of 
issue of banknotes to a new central bank, to be 
created by English capitalists. The government 
knew the outside rescuers would pay handsomely 
for the privilege of becoming Spain’s central 
bankers. The local banks of issue would be 
eliminated, and the new central bank would have a 
monopoly of issue for the whole country, more like 
the Bank of England.
Ru: So, two questions! what happened to the 
banking system, and what happened to that 
machiavellian plan?
The plan failed, due to the financial crisis in London 
after the fall of Overend & Gurney. The British had 
their own crisis, so they could no longer consider 
creating a central bank for Spain. At the end of the 
day, there was no longer a Plan B, so the government 
could not let the Banco de España collapse.
But without a lender of last resort, Spain suffered a 
tremendous credit crunch, much worse than France, 
Italy, or the U.S. Some countries protected 
themselves through an explicit lender of last resort, 
others through suspension of convertibility and a 
more expansive monetary policy. Spain was the only 
country that stayed attached to gold throughout the 
whole period, without a lender of last resort. Half the 
financial system collapsed, causing a collapse in 
credit, a huge economic crisis, and deflation. By 
1868 this contributed to the so-called Glorious 
Revolution, which deposed queen Isabel II and 
expelled her from the country. Eventually there was 
a liberal government, the First Republic of Spain, 
which implemented reforms to improve debt 
sustainability and create a healthier financial system, 
leading to some recovery from 1868 to 1874.
Ru: Goodhart and Perotti argued recently that 
old-fashioned bill discounting was much safer 
than the more modern business of long-term 
investment financing. The constrast between the 
issuing banks and the credit societies supports 
that view, no?
Yes, the issuing banks did far better. Only three of 
the thirteen larget credit societies survived, among 
them Crédito Mobiliario Español, the forerunner of 
Banesto today. But most of the issuing banks 
survived. Some were merged with the Banco de 
España, becoming what are now its regional 
branches. Other local banks chose not to merge 
with the Banco de España; they lost their note 
issuing privileges and became ordinary banks. 
Those included the Bank of Bilbao and the Bank of 
Santander. 
Ru: you are also working on contemporary 
banking and finance issues. you and Carlos 
Thomas have a paper on bank leverage dynamics.
Macroeconomists have long studied firms that face 
financial frictions, and there is a huge finance literature 
on the role of banks. Central banks often have a dual 
mandate for price stability and financial stability, 
where monetary policy guides inflation, while bank 
safety is addressed through regulation and inspection. 
The recent crisis reminded us that those issues are 
really inseparable, and we need to study how the 
financial system interacts with the real economy. In 
particular, we need to model the role of banks in 
general equilibrium, which is what we do.
Ru: what did you find, empirically, in the paper?
Leverage dynamics are surprisingly controversial. 
Banks’ leverage is the ratio of their total assets to 
their equity; greater leverage means they are more 
deeply indebted. In the data, leverage initially seems 
procyclical— banks take on more debt and pay more 
dividends in booms, and then deleverage and 
recapitalize in recessions. However, some researchers 
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have questioned that conclusion, claiming it is an 
artifact of measuring assets at book value rather 
than at market value. Imagine that you buy a house 
for a given amount of money. On your bank’s 
balance sheet, that is the (book) value of the house. 
But if, in a crisis, the market price of the house falls 
faster than the bank can reduce its debt, then bank 
capital is destroyed. This might raise leverage 
during crises. By analyzing the data carefully, we 
found that while these price effects reduce the 
procyclicality of leverage, they are not strong 
enough to make it countercyclical. 
But then we wanted to understand what determines 
banks’ leverage, and how this affects the economy. 
A crucial issue, related to the 19th century questions 
we discussed earlier, is banks’ limited liability. When 
banks issue debt, either in the form of deposits or 
bonds, the tail risks of investments ultimately lie 
with the lenders, not the bank. Therefore, lenders 
want banks to hold sufficient equity to act as a 
cushion against reckless behavior. So regardless of 
the regulatory regime, bondholders exert some 
degree of market discipline that discourages 
overleveraging. 
Ru: what mechanisms do lenders have to force 
banks to increase equity?
They can increase the haircut on new debt. They 
can restrict new bond issuance or rollovers. If the 
bank wants to maintain its investments, bondholders 
may no longer be willing to issue so much debt 
unless it is accompanied by increased equity. So 
this may either force an increase in equity or a 
reduction in investment.
But when economic uncertainty increases, this can 
set off a vicious circle of fire sales. Bondholders get 
nervous, and they require banks to raise equity and 
cut debt. But if all the banks try to sell assets at the 
same time, then asset prices collapse, making 
bondholders even more nervous. So even as banks 
try to reduce leverage, it may increase through this 
price effect. Then banks are forced to slash credit, 
and firms are forced to reduce investment and hiring, 
so wages will fall too. That creates a crisis that feeds 
through to the real economy, including households.
Ru: in your model, these cycles are driven by 
exogenous shocks to uncertainty, which are then 
amplified by this leverage effect, right? Because it 
seems that feedback loop could also generate 
endogenous cycles.
Yes, it is an amplifying mechanism. A fully nonlinear 
version of our model might feature endogenous 
uncertainty and hence endogenous crises, as in 
Brunnermeier and Sannikov’s work. But our paper 
focuses on a linearized model, feeding in exogenous 
shocks to uncertainty. And when we test the role of 
those shocks statistically, allowing for shocks to 
TFP and investment technology too, the uncertainty 
shock is crucial for explaining the dynamics of the 
banking system, and  the depth and duration of the 
crisis. If the main problem had been productivity or 
investment shocks, the recession would have been 
shallow, with a quick recovery. The deep, L-shaped 
recession we have seen was mainly due to the 
problems in banks’ balance sheets, and their 
deleveraging process.
Ru: So the severity of this crisis was due to the 
long period of stability that preceded it, which 
allowed banks and firms to grow exceptionally 
leveraged?
Partially, yes. Banks leveraged up because they 
thought uncertainty was low, and when the crisis 
began they realized they were far too deeply 
indebted. And the deleveraging process, even if it 
was fairly fast, was very painful for the real economy. 
In future work, we may model some macroprudential 
policies to see whether reducing these financial 
fluctuations would improve welfare.
Ru: Finally, what are you working on now?
Lately I am developing continuous-time methods 
for solving heterogeneous agent models. That 
might sound abstract, but heterogeneity is directly 
relevant for many policy questions. For example, if 
there are financial frictions, policy affects different 
people and different firms differently. And obviously 
a rise in interest rates squeezes debtors, making 
them pay more on their mortgages, while savers 
receive more interest income. Issues that are in the 
press every day, like “too big to fail”, are rarely 
modeled formally— most papers have a 
representative bank, so no bank is bigger than the 
others. Thomas Piketty, for instance, has highlighted 
how wealth inequality matters for so many 
macroeconomic issues, from taxes, to central 
banking. 
So modeling heterogeneity is very important, and it 
is often easier to do in continuous time instead of 
discrete time. Personally, I have been working with 
Benjamin Moll to develop tools for solving games in 
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ongoing projects investigates the international 
propagation mechanisms of U.S. shocks that 
persist into the medium frequency, paying special 
attention to the role of bilateral trade linkages 
between the U.S. and EMU economies. The project 
explores the consequences of a persistent 
slowdown in technical progress in the U.S. (assumed 
to be the technological leader) for the medium-term 
performance of technology-recipient countries. In 
addition, Mónica is studying the consequences of 
product market reforms in the service sector for the 
competitiveness of Spanish manufacturing firms. 
She finds that a more competitive environment in 
services positively influences firms’ performance 
both in terms of their intermediate input prices and 
their sales abroad. The project also emphasizes the 
relevance of firm size for quantifying the economic 
impact of reforms. Finally, a third ongoing project 
addresses the long-run relationship between 
monetary policy regimes, credibility, and the 
properties of inflation to cast light on the institutional 
framework that has historically been best suited to 
the aim of stable inflation.
heterogeneous agent models. The games we have 
in mind are situations where a policy maker chooses 
instruments that affect the behavior of a whole 
distribution of agents. So these games can be 
viewed as the strategic interaction of one player 
with a continuum of other players. 
Carlos Thomas and I plan to apply these methods 
to monetary policy in a monetary union: a game 
between a single central bank and many 
heterogeneous countries. Also, similar questions 
arise for optimal monetary policy in a single 
economy with heterogeneous households. 
MONIca cORRea-lópez 
Staff economist
Monetary Policy Division
Monetary and Financial Studies Department
MONIca cOrrEa-LópEz joined the Monetary Policy 
Division of the Banco de España in May 2015 after 
holding a senior economist post at BBVA Research. 
Mónica received her Ph.D. and M.Sc. in Economics 
from the University of Warwick (U.k.) and her B.Sc. 
in Economics from Universidad Carlos III (Spain). 
During her formative years, she was awarded the 
Ph.D. scholarship of the University of Warwick and 
the Marie Curie Doctoral Fellowship of the European 
Commission, which financed a period of research at 
Tilburg University (Netherlands). Mónica has taught 
economics at graduate and undergraduate levels in 
the subjects of macroeconomics, international 
economics, industrial organization and economic 
history, at the University of Warwick, Universidad 
Carlos III and the Universidad de Valencia.
Mónica’s research centers primarily on the fields of 
macroeconomics, industrial organization and labor 
economics. Her current interests include the 
international transmission of medium-term cycles, 
productivity, inflation, and firms’ performance in 
international markets, among others. One of her 
papers mentioned
Alessio Moro, Galo Nuño, and Pedro Tedde (2015), “A twin 
crisis with multiple banks of issue: Spain in the 1860s.” 
European Review of Economic History 19 (2).
Galo Nuño and Carlos Thomas (2014), “Bank leverage 
cycles.” Manuscript, Banco de España, December.
Benjamin Moll and Galo Nuño (2015), “Optimal control 
with heterogeneous agents in continuous time.” 
Manuscript, Banco de España, September.
rEsEarch paGE:
http://www.bde.es/investigador/en/menu/research_staff_a/Nuno_
Barrau__Galo.html
NEw FACES
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aLEssaNdrO GaLEsI joined the Monetary Policy 
Division of the Banco de España in September 
2015. Alessandro obtained his Ph.D. in Economics 
from CEMFI in June 2015. He also holds an M.Phil. 
in Economics and Finance from CEMFI, and an 
M.Sc. and B.Sc. in Economics from the University 
of Pisa. He worked at the External Developments 
Division of the European Central Bank, first as intern 
in 2009, then as consultant in 2010 for developing 
the Global VAR Toolbox and in 2015 for extending 
the IVAR Toolbox. Over the period 2012-2014 he 
also worked as research assistant to Prof. Claudio 
Michelacci for the European Research Council 
(ERC) project: “Estimation of General Equilibrium 
Labor Market Search Models”.
Alessandro does research in the fields of 
macroeconomics, housing, and macroeconometrics. 
The five chapters of his doctoral research contribute 
to business cycle analysis in two directions: first, by 
presenting new theories of housing, macroeconomics, 
and their interplay, and second, by providing novel 
estimation techniques for dynamic factor models. In 
his latest paper Alessandro documents a downward 
trend in construction productivity relative to other 
industries, for the U.S. economy, which started 
around the end of the 1960s and still persists. He 
shows that the interaction of this productivity 
slowdown in construction and the low interest rates 
at which the United States has borrowed from the 
rest of the world over recent decades can help explain 
recent developments in the U.S. housing cycle and 
current account.
Alessandro is currently studying the role of “Make it 
in America” policies, introduced by the current U.S. 
administration to support the manufacturing sector. 
The research assesses how the Great Recession 
would have differed if the U.S. government had not 
subsidized the manufacturing sector. 
rEsEarch paGE:
http://www.bde.es/investigador/en/menu/research_staff_a/
Galesi__alessandro.html
OMar rachEdI joined the Research Division of the 
Banco de España in September 2015. Omar 
obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from Universidad 
Carlos III de Madrid in July 2015. He also holds an 
undergraduate and M.Sc. degree in Economics 
from the Università di Pisa and an M.Sc. in 
Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. 
Before joining the Banco de España, he worked one 
year as risk analyst at Deloitte Consulting in Milan. 
Omar has also been a professional middle-distance 
runner for the Arma dei Carabinieri, appearing nine 
times for the Italian national team.
His research interests combine macroeconomic 
and financial theory with computational and 
empirical methods to address policy-relevant 
research questions, with a particular focus on asset 
pricing and the housing market. Omar has explored 
how changes in U.S. financial markets over the 
1980s could have affected the capital structure of 
corporate firms, and eventually the dynamics of 
corporate default rates and corporate credit 
spreads. In another project, he has looked at the 
asset pricing implications of households’ limited 
attention to the stock market. Finally, his job market 
alessaNdRO GalesI 
Staff economist
Monetary Policy Division
Monetary and Financial Studies Department
OMaR RachedI 
Staff Economist
Research Division
Monetary and Financial Studies Department
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paper studies how fluctuations in aggregate 
volatility can cause financial crises. Omar shows 
that movements in uncertainty can alter the 
pledgeability of households’ collateral, leading to 
booms and busts in the credit market and real 
economic activity.
Omar is currently studying the causes of the recent 
U.S housing market bust and the potential 
implications in terms of macroprudential policy. 
This research points out how movements in the 
liquidity of the housing market can affect 
households’ access to credit and lead future 
changes in the house price.
rEsEarch paGE:
https://sites.google.com/site/omirachedi/
aNtOINe lOepeR 
Assistant Professor
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
ANTOINE LOEPER is visiting the Research Division 
from September 2015 until July 2016. He received his 
undergraduate training in engineering at Ecole 
Polytechnique in Paris in 2001, and completed a PhD 
in Economics at the Toulouse School of Economics in 
2006. Before joining Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
as an Assistant Professor of Economics in 2011, he 
was an Assistant Professor at the kellogg School of 
Management, Northwestern University.
Antoine specializes in political economy, public 
economics, and microeconomic theory. His early 
research was on the political economy of federal 
systems. In particular, he was interested in the conflict 
of interests among local jurisdictions generated by 
cross-jurisdictional externalities, and whether such 
externalities justify the centralization of policy-making 
responsibilities. He has also worked on models of 
social learning with applications to the dynamics of 
social movements. His current research focuses on 
dynamic models of bargaining among policy makers.
His research at the Bank of Spain investigates 
whether institutions composed of policy makers 
with heterogeneous preferences and beliefs can 
respond in a timely and effective manner to a 
changing environment. He uses dynamic 
bargaining models in which heterogeneous 
members of a policy-making institution (e.g., 
members of a legislature, or members of a 
monetary policy committee) must constantly revise 
the current policy to adapt to economic and 
political shocks. These models focus on the 
frictions generated by the conflicts of interest 
among policy makers, how the bargaining 
procedure affects such frictions, and whether they 
generate excessive policy inertia.
rEsEarch paGE: 
http://www.eco.uc3m.es/personal/aloeper/
ViSiTiNG FEllOwS
MaRtÍN sOla
Professor of Economics 
UTDT (Buenos Aires) and Birkbeck (London)
MartÍN sOLa is visiting the Research Division from 
September until November 2015. He is a Professor 
at the Universidad Torcuato di Tella (UTDT) in 
Buenos Aires, and a part-time Professor at Birkbeck, 
University of London. He has held visiting positions 
at the IAE (Barcelona) and at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St Louis. He received his Ph.D. in economics 
from the University of Southampton in 1991.
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His research areas include nonlinear time series 
analysis, monetary economics and finance. He has 
studied how to incorporate regime changes into 
forward-looking models with rational expectations. 
Recently, he has investigated how bond, stock and 
options pricing models have to be modified to 
account for regime changes. He has published in 
journals such as the Journal of Econometrics, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, and European 
Economic Review. He is an associate editor for the 
journal Studies in Noninear Dynamics and 
Econometrics, and has been a recognized as a 
distinguished author of the Journal of Applied 
Econometrics.
Martín’s research at the Banco de España investigates 
the use of a discrete-time affine model of commodity 
futures which is able to handle stochastic seasonality. 
His specification makes it possible to measure and 
price seasonal risks by attaching market prices of 
risks to the seasonal factors. By imposing some 
strong restrictions on the evolution of risk-neutral 
probabilities, his model is able to identify the market 
prices of risk and the risk premia associated with 
different trading strategies, which is otherwise a 
difficult identification problem in affine models.
rEsEarch paGE:  
http://www.bbk.ac.uk/ems/faculty/sola
JOB OpENINGs FOr phd EcONOMIsts
25 NOVEMBER 2015
The Banco de España wishes to hire experienced or 
newly qualified PhD economists for positions at its 
headquarters in Madrid. Desired areas of expertise 
include monetary policy, international economics, 
macro-finance, banking and finance, industrial 
organization, and applied micro- and macroeconomics. 
See job details at EconJobMarket.org >
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